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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
A quick survey of social science literature seems 
to reveal the need for an interdisciplinary approach to 
the study of many issues that have traditionally been 
confined to one or two disciplines. The phenomenon of 
charismatic leadership* is one such issue that appears to 
receive sufficient attention only in the areas of Political 
Science and Sociology. An adequate understanding of th~s 
phenomenon is especially vital for many a third world 
country that, frequently, finds little beyond the wisdom 
or lack of it -- of a leader to hold its many diverse 
elements together. 
There are also problems endemic to these countries 
that render the task of building a viable nation-state an 
extremely difficult one to tackle. This is not the place 
to provide a comprehensive catalogue of these problems, 
but suffice it to say that the absence of institutional 
and democratic processes and the inability of the state to 
replace loyalty to the tribe or the province with loyalty 
*Charismatic leadership, according to Max Weber, is "a 
certain quality of an individual personality by which 
he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed 
with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically 
exceptional powers or qualities''. (From The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organization by .Hax Weber, p. 35~) 
to its own institutions seem to be among the factors lead-
ing to the emergence of the leader increasingly known as 
the charismatic personality. 
The charismatic leader~ however, is not a third 
world phenomena. Churchill, DeGaulle, Hitler and Stalin 
have all been described as charismatic leaders. But these 
men are all, in one way or the other, inheritors and 
custodians of states whose political traditions and experi-
ence in the world of nation-states is well established. 
Such, of course, is not the case with Ghana, Indonesia, 
and a multitude of other third world countries. They are 
invariably thrust into a world characterized by the domi-
nance of the nation-state. It is a world in which their 
mere survival, not to mention development, is predicated 
upon their acceptance of and compliance with a system of 
centralized authority and institutions. 
This centralization and focusing of authority 
relationships has paved the way for the emergence of a new, 
and mostly western, brand of leadership. Individuals such 
' as Ghandi, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Nasser are but a few 
examples of this new species of leadership. In order to 
be successful, the leader is required to perform two sets 
of roles: (1) He must be able to provide a leadership 
that supersedes and compensates for traditional leadership. 
His relationship with his followers must be both inspira-
tional and a fulcrum that is capable of representing and 
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maintaining the various brands of leadership preceding 
his emergence. He must become a true father-figure 
providing experience, firmness, compassion and trust that 
he is capable of navigating the national destiny through 
the unfamiliar terrain of the new world. (2) The leader 
must also become a catalyst around whom the various social 
elements can be grouped and mobilized for the task of 
solving ethnic, political, economic and social problems. 
All brands of leadership depend, to some extent, 
upon an adequate system of communication between the 
leader and the followers. Some even perceive it as 11 a 
process of communication, or connection between leader 
and followers" (Deutstch 1966:157). Communication 
between leader and followers in a traditional setting is 
mostly based on a face-to-face approach. The leader pro-
vides inspiration or arouses trust by his presence, example 
and availability. This is impossible in the nation-state 
setting since the leader must maintain a reasonable distance 
in order to be able to perform all of his responsibilities. 
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I. The Purpose of the Thesis 
The preceding discussion is intended to point out 
the two central and interdependent themes running through 
this thesis. Briefly stated, these themes are: 
A. Charismatic leadership exists in emerging 
countries of the third world due mainly to the fact that 
other forms of leadership are incapable of overcoming 
simultaneously the multitude of problems facing these 
countries and the disintegrative tendencies inherent in 
provincial or tribal sentiment and loyalty. 
B. An effective system of communication is essen-
tial to practically all brands of leadership. However, its 
import for charismatic leadership takE:s on an immediacy and 
a higher degree of significance due to the specific, 
situational context in which the leader appears and func-
tions. 
An adequate understanding and appreciation of these 
two themes can only be attained through a discussion and 
clarification of some questions relative to: 
A. What are the specific characteristics that 
distinguish charismatic leadership from other forms of 
leadership. Put somewhat differently, this question 
becomes: at what point does the leader cross the demar-
cation line separating the charismatic from the non-
charismatic leaders? 
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B. What are the relevant and specific cultural 
beliefs and needs contributing to the rise of charismatic 
leaders? Do these needs and beliefs vary from culture to 
culture and what is the significance of such variance? 
c. What is the specific nature of the leader-
follower relationship? 
D. What type of communication strategy is especial-
ly relevant to the needs of charismatic leaders? What 
cultural symbols and myths are used, and how do national 
causes and the manner in which they are articulated contri-
bute to the process of image promotion and eventually 
elevation of the leader? 
E. What are the elements of a communication system 
suited to the sustenance of charismatic leadership? What 
elements of this system are important and what parts are 
absolutely crucial? 
Answers to these questions are necessary to satisfy 
our "need to know what the charismatic leader does to assert 
and impose his authority over those he presumes to lead 
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and how he does it", according to Ann R. and Dorothy Willner. 
Most of the research (and writings) concerning this pheno-
menon clearly indicates that conclusive answers to these and 
other questions are not yet attainable. This is partly 
due to the fact that most writers seem to suggest (i.e. R. 
Tucker, the Willners, Shill, etc.) that universal criteria 
for the detection of charismatic leadership can be estab-
lished. The feasibility of such an approach is not within 
the range of this thesis. Rather, the goal is to take a 
different path suggesting the viability of this concept 
within a third world context. 
More specifically what this thesis attempts to 
demonstrate is that for the first time in the recent 
history of the third~world, political authority -- i.e. 
charismatic leadership -- has been based not on the leader's 
capacity for religious appeal, not on a cohesive and well 
disciplined party structure, and not on a clear ideological 
commitment, but on a thorough and efficient use of all 
available channels of communication. The spark and the 
impetus responsible for the initial emergence of the leader 
may be the result of a heroic act (i.e. the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal in Egypt, or the formal independence from 
a colonial power in Ghana, Indonesia etc.). But the 
development of the charismatic image, and the follower's 
identification with the leader can only come about through 
a communication design that enables the leader to keep in 
"constant touch" with the population. Charisma, thus per-
ceived, is not only the result of solid and visible accom-
plishments in the economic, military or political spheres. 
But even within a third world context it is 
virtually impossible to make sweeping generalizations about 
a charismatic "pattern". For in each case the leader is 
confronted with a different set of circumstances that render 
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mere duplication a remote occurrence. Upon assuming the 
mantle of leadership, he is thrust against the constraints 
of a colonial background, on the one hand, and the con-
straints of a peculiar cultural milieu on the other. Thus, 
it can be safely argued that the India Ghandi helped 
liberate from under the yoke of British imperialism with 
its numerous castes and its different languages was vastly 
different from the Ghana that Nkrumah inherited from the 
same colonial power. 
These and other differences relevant to the emer-
gence of the charismatic leader play a decisive role as far 
as the development of a charismatic situation is concerned. 
Discussion of these issues will be deferred to the section 
devoted to the theory and application of the charismatic 
concept. For the purposes of this limited and introductory 
discussion suffice it to state that two requirements are 
absolutely essential for the fulfillment of a charismatic 
situation. First, the leader needs to mold a solid base 
of followers. In other words he needs a constituency and 
an audience. Unlike other forms of leadership, the charis-
matic leader requires and demands interaction and feedback 
on as regular and recurrent a basis as the situation allows. 
One cannot emphasize enough the value of a sound system of 
feedback to a leadership whose survival is not so much a 
function of its accomplishments as it is a function of its 
ability to forge a common identity with the people. David 
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Easton saw the capacity of a system to persist in the face 
of stress as a "function of the presence and nature of the 
information and other influences that return to its actors 
and decision-makers" {Easton 1965:25). The second require-
ment, and one that is equally crucial, is the availability 
of or the creation of a cause that can serve as a rallying 
point. However, causes vary in intensity and appeal, but 
the charismatic leader's success in demonstrating the sig-
nificance of his cause is essential to the creation of a 
charismatic situation. 
Once the charismatic situation is realized, the 
leader turns his attention to its maintenance and perpetu-
ation. This is usually accomplished in a variety of ways, 
some of which are: 
(1) The leader responds effectively to the per-
ceived and real needs of the population. His ability to 
bring about major reforms and to improve the standard of 
living of the population become central to his cha~ismatic 
appeal. Realistically, this is easier said than done since 
the problems and their solutions may be beyond his reach 
{overpopulation, lack of adequate resources, international, 
economic and political considerations, lack of technically 
and bureaucratically trained personnel, etc.). There is 
also the question of the leader's ability and willingness 
to tackle tedious administrative responsibilities. Capable 
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or not, the leader needs to show some kind of movement 
toward the solution of national problems. 
(2) The charismatic leader may choose to appeal to 
the nation's need for a father-figure as well as its need 
to forge a common identity. The leader, thus, focuses his 
attention on promoting the image of a savior,~ pioneer, 
and an indispensible navigator of national destiny. Many 
a charismatic leader has been known to encourage the cir-
culation of labels such as Bung Karno, the Rais (Nasser) 
and the Savior (Nkrumah). Once the leader's image is 
successfully linked to "the national cause" it assumes a 
transcendental quality toward which the citizenry may feel 
a remarkable degree of attachment. Needless to say, this 
path demands a special knowledge and appreciation of the 
various means of communication and persuasion available 
to the leader. 
These two strategies are not mutually exclusive. 
All leaders need to communicate to their followers their 
perceptions of the present and their dreams for the future. 
But there is a marked difference between the use of communi-
cation channels as substitutes for solid accomplishments, 
and their use as methods of clarification and guidance. 
Drawing on this conceptual framework, the major 
thrust of this thesis will, then, be an attempt to answer 
the following questions: (1) What, exactly, is charismatic 
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leadership? In other words, what are the distinctive 
features that make it different from other types of 
leadership? (2) Under what circumstances does this pheno-
menon usually emerge? Are there specific circumstances and 
beliefs inherent in an emerging nation's makeup that 
contribute to its growth? Put somewhat differently, what 
follower's need and what cultural components give rise to 
charismatic leadership? (3) What part does the leader's 
communication ability and consciousness play in promoting 
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his charismatic image? What methods and strategies of 
communication are adapted and employed, and with what effect? 
Admittedly, no single study is capable of providing 
exhaustive and definitive answers to such broad questions. 
Rather, the goal is of a much humbler nature since the 
answers and the conclusions are both suggestive and tenta-
tive. The fact that this study will, in some depth, deal 
with only one third world country and with only one leader 
puts further limitations on its generalizability. But the 
case for studying Nasser's so-called charismatic brand of 
leadership, and the communication strategy on which it 
largely depended, is a compelling one. For in many ways 
Egypt is representative of a large number of third world 
countries. It is a country plagued by overpopulation, lack 
of adequate resources, a long and repressive colonial back-
' 
ground and a population that until the last few years depen-
ded almost totally on ancient methods of land utilization. 
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But it is in Egypt, more perhaps than in any other 
third world country, that a leader has been successful in 
effecting what Daniel Lerner aptly termed "a communication 
revolution" (Lerner 1958:251). National consensus, and 
later, national acceptance of the leader have largely been 
engineered through a meticulous and emotionally charged ex-
ploitation of the various methods and channels of communica-
tion. Thus, concentrating on certain "crucial" periods and 
events of Nasser's presidency, an attempt will be made to 
illuminate certain aspects of his leadership, and the extent 
to which his continuity and survival in office after severe, 
and crushing defeats is attributable to the communication 
revolution Lerner spoke of. 
II. Organization 
Thus the second chapter will be basically devoted 
to an exploration of the various classifications of leader-
ship, followed by a review of the literature devoted to 
charismatic leadership. An attempt will be made to show 
the critical features and components of the concept which 
hopefully will enable us to present a comprehensive opera-
tional definition of charismatic leadership. Besides this 
definitional attempt, an effort will be made to show both 
the relevance and the significance of this phenomenon to 
a systematic understanding of the politico-social processes 
at work in most third world countries and the communication 
strategies and networks necessitated by these processes. 
This new significance that communication strategy 
seems to assume in the emergence of charismatic leadership 
raises a serious question. Is this brand of leadership 
so crucially dependent for its emergence and maintenance on 
certain technological and political transformations similar 
to that envisaged by Weber? Whereas Weber's chari~matic 
leadership seems to inhere almost entirely in qualities 
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that are both transcendental and peculiar to the individual 
leader, this new phenomenon seems to reside largely in 
circumstances and elements drawn from the environment. The 
inadequacy of the Weberian formulation will, it is hoped, be 
pointed out and 'a new label for the phenomenon suggested. 
The third part will be concerned with a number of 
questions related to the interplay between communication 
patterns, language structure including the choice of words 
' and concepts and its impact on personality and cognitive 
structure in the contemporary Arab world. Many students of 
Arab culture have suggested that Arabic, as a language, is 
one of the most crucial factors to be taken into considera-
tion in any attempt at an adequate understanding of the 
emotional and intellectual components of that culture. 
This assessment, if correct, has tremendous impli-
cations for the prevalence of certain communication channels 
and the emergence of certain types of political leadership 
in the area. 
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With a Whorfian hypothesis as our point of 
departure, a number of studies purporting to uncover the 
special significance of the Arabic language to the emotional 
and intellectual development of the individual Arab will 
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be discussed with an eye to the communication receptivity 
engendered by this situation. 
The fourth chapter will be devoted to the case 
study. Following a brief description of the social and 
political conditions preceding and leading to Nasser's rise, 
we shall address ourselves to the following questions: 
(1) What evidence of the presence or the absence of a 
natural charisma can we point to in the early part of 
Nasser's career? (2) What kinds of communication and 
persuasion methods were used during this era? And with 
what effect? (3) Can we find linkages between the emer-
gence of the "embryonic features" of a charismatic leader-
ship, and the improvement in the leader's use of persuasion 
techniques? (4) What adJustments in the use of these 
techniques are the result of shifts in the international 
and local conditions? 
A discussion of Nasser's oratorical style and the 
special emphasis he put on the use of radio, television, 
the press, songs and the various fqce-to-face efforts using 
opinion leaders will be central to this part of the study. 
This will be directly linked to the rise of his charismatic 
fortunes. The leader's use of cultural symbols and myths 
will also be alluded to. It is virtually impossible to 
gauge with certainty and precision the exact contribution 
of the leader's use of communication and persuasion tech-
niques to the maintenance of his leadership position, but 
that will not deter us from bringing the weight of histo-
tical evidence to bear on this aspect. 
The study will, then, be concluded with a synthesis 
of the previous chapters out of which certain conclusions 
will hopefully be drawn. These co~clusions will fall into 
two general areas of concern. The first area is the ques-
tion of whether charismatic leadership is a genuine and 
original characteristic of the leader, or whether it is a 
learned trait developed either in response to popular 
needs or formed by shrewd observers of the human mind. A 
second domain of concern revolves around the question of 
whether a leader's survival in office is attributable to 
his effective use of the various communication facilities. 
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Chapter II 
LEADERSHIP AND SITUATION 
Interest in leaders and leadership qualities is 
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one of the most recurring themes in human literature. 
Repetition, however, does not mean exhaustion. The numerous 
and different definitions of leadership seem to reflect 
this fact. This confusion is further complicated by situ-
ational and cultural factors. For what is appropriate 
leadership behavior in a military organization may be the 
wrong leadership behavior in an insurance agency. Culture 
exerts still more complications since strict but appropriate 
leadership standards in one culture may be seen as cruel 
and excessive in another. 
Nevertheless this persistence of interest in leader-
ship is easily explainable. Cartwright and Zander noted 
that, "Leadership is viewed as the performance of those acts 
which help the group achieve its preferred outcomes 11 (Cart-
wright and Zander 1960:492). Leadership, thus seen, is an 
important human activity whose value is measured by its 
ability to preserve and advance both the individual and 
group. 
Defining Leadership: As was mentioned earlier, 
the variety of perspectives within which the subject has 
been approached seem to account for the numerous definitions 
one encounters. Fred E. Fiedler and M. Chemers in their 
book Leadership and Effective Management, cite at least six 
different definitions of leadership. Here are some of 
these definitions: 
"Leadership is the exercise of authority and the 
making of decisions" (Dublin, 1955). 
"The leader is one who succeeds in getting others 
to follow him" (Cowley, 1928). 
"Leadership is the process of influencing group 
activities toward goal setting and goal achievement" 
(Stogdill, 1948). 
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The authors then make two observations concerning 
the nature of leadership. "The first," they maintain, "is 
that leadership is a relationship between people in which 
influence and power are unevenly distributed on a legitimate 
basis . The second important thread is that there can 
be no leaders in isolation." 
Needless to say, Fiedler and Chemers are speaking 
with one kind of leadership in mind, namely management 
leadership. However, all kinds of leadership demand some 
basis of legitimacy --varying in broadness -- and all 
sorts of leadership dictate a leader-follower relationship. 
Beyond this cursory look at definitional attempts, 
two other points concerning the nature of leadership seem 
to meet wide acceptance in the field. 
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A -- Based upon a comprehensive survey of 124 books 
and articles which reported attempts to study the traits 
and characteristics of leaders, R. M. Stogdill offered the 
following conclusion: "The average person who occupies a 
position of leadership exceeds the average member of his 
group in such abilities as intelligence, scholarship, 
knowing how to get things done, insight into situations, 
verbal facility, and adaptability" (Shaw 1971:269). 
B -- Another approach stresses the situation in 
which the leader finds himself. "Leadership," states W. o. 
Jenkins "is specific to the particular situation under 
investigation" (Jenkins 1947:54). The strongest support for 
this approach, however, comes from the extensive studies 
conducted by F. E. Fiedler (1964, 1967) regarding the Con-
' 
tingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness. Fiedler summed 
up the results of his studies thus "The Contingency Model 
leads to the major hypothesis that leadership effectiveness 
depends upon the leader's style of interacting with his 
group members and the favorableness of the group-task situa-
tion" (Fiedler 1968:81). 
This emphasis on the dynamic relationship between 
the demands of the situation on the one hand, and the 
leader-follower attraction on the other is central to the 
distinction this study purports to draw between the charis-
matic leader and other kinds of leadership. 
Max Weber's concept of Charismatic Leadership is 
certainly one of the most debated concepts in the social 
sciences today. The debate centers around a number of 
seemingly relevant questions: 
A What makes a certain leader charismatic? 
B Of what utility, in Weber's view, is this 
concept to an understanding of our contemporary world? In 
other words, can a concept so grounded in the religious 
realm have much relevance to an increasingly secular world? 
C -- What explanatory potential does the concept 
have for the post-colonial leaderships common to most 
third world countries? 
In answering the first question we shall attempt to 
delineate Weber's formulation of the concept, and its 
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further explanation and elaboration by others. Criticisms 
and obJections concerning the concept's utility and viability 
will, then, be pointed out. Consequently, the concept's 
relevance -- or lack of relevance -- for understanding 
t~e problems and challenges of leadership in third world 
countries will be addressed. 
It is hoped that discussion of these issues will be 
beneficial in the attempt to show that what passes for char-
ismatic leadership in many a third world country is radi-
cally different from Weber's original conception and formula-
tion. Central to this analysis is an acute appreciation of 
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the impact of the various means of persuasion -- namely com-
munication channels -- now available to the leader. 
I -- Review of the Literature 
Max Weber's interest in authority relationships 
and the various methods by which authority gains legiti-
mation (i.e. acceptance of the leader's exercise of power 
because it is in line with values held by the subJects) 
have been central to his work and contributions. His 
classification of authority legitimation falls into three 
"ideal" types: 
1. Traditional Authority: respect for traditional 
authority is based on "an established belief 
in the sanctity of immemorial traditions". 
2. Charismatic Authority: rests on the belief 
that the leader is gifted with a magnetic 
and superior leadership quality. 
3. Bureaucratic or rational-legal authority: 
Legitimacy in this category is derived 
from the population's acceptance of a binding 
set of abstract rules. 
It is in the second category -- charismatic authority 
that we are interested. Weber's often quoted definition 
of charisma is that it is: a certain quality of an 
individual personaltiy by virtue of which he is set apart 
from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or 
qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the 
ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or 
as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual 
concerned is treated as a leader (Henerson and Parsons 
1947:129). 
The recurrence of words like "divine" and "super-
natural" are due to the fact that Weber has borrowed the 
concept from "Rudolf Sohm, the Strassburg, church historian 
and Jurist" (Gerth and Mills 1958:52). Charisma, then, is 
rooted in Christian legacy as well as it is in Weber's 
conception of the charismatic leader as a "continuation 
of a philosophy of his~ory that, after Carlyle's Heroes and 
Hero Worship, influenced a great deal of nineteenth-century 
history writing'' (Gerth and Mills 1958:53). This view ad-
vocated by C. Wright Mills and H. H. Gerth seems to be in 
agreement with the views of most of the social scientists 
who have tackled Weber's complex formulation. 
But a leader is not charismatic only because he 
possesses a certain "vision" of the future, or because 
of an exceptiona1 will and self-confidence. He is charis-
matic because he can transfer this vision and this confi-
dence to his followers, and to consequently stir in them 
both "loyalty" to himself and a "beliefn in his exceptional 
powers and qualitiesG "His charisma" according to Ann R .. 
and Dorothy Willner, "resides in the perceptions of the 
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people he leads" (Willner and Willner 1965:79). 
This emphasis on the leader-follower duality is 
essential to an understanding of the increasing tendency 
to view charismatic leadership as a socio-political pheon-
menon by calling attention to the situation that prepares 
the soil for the emergence of the leader. The leader, 
according to this mode of analysis, cannot be separated 
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from the circumstances that breed the charismatic situation. 
His emergence is integrally linked to a deeply felt need 
for an extraordinary response in times of despair and 
decline. The charismatic situation, in Weber's view, is 
one that is characterized by "psychic, physical, economic, 
ethical, religious and political distresses" (Gerth and Mills 
1958:245). 
The charismatic leader, presumably, recognizes the 
gravity of the situation and summons the people to follow 
him on the path of salvation and deliverance. What distin-
guishes the charismatic leader from other types of leader-
ship is the ability to elicit strong and intense responses 
from a large segment of the population. Unlike ordinary 
leaders in ordinary times, he is able to touch and stir 
deep and sometimes violent reservoirs of passion and 
commitment among the population. This mission as defined 
by the leader "is accepted as a duty by a wide circle of 
his followers because of their belief in his extraordinary 
qualities; their degree of commitment is higher than for 
any other form of authority" (Dow 1968:329). 
The leader's charisma flows from his mastery of, 
and grip on, the people's dream that he constantly visual-
izes for those around him. His leadership position is only 
secured by his ability to convince his followers that his 
vision of the future will come to pass. This is a far cry 
from ordinary kinds of ,leadership if only by virtue of the 
all encompassing and supernatural views and claims the 
leader makes. Robert c. Tucker termed it "specifically 
salvationist or messianic in nature" (Tucker 1968:743). 
This should also enable us to see another aspect 
of charismatic leadership: it is a rejectionist type of 
leadership. It is alien to the world of everyday routine; 
it calls for new ways of life and thought. Its ultimate 
goal is to rewrite the rules of the game and to redress 
the grievances of the leader's followers. 
II Theoretical Criticism 
The concept of charismatic leadership has lately 
been subjected to incisive and rigorous criticism from a 
number of social scientists who are troubled by either; 
a) the extent of the concept's applicability and relevance, 
orb) the lack of a detailed description of those specifi-
cally personal qualities of the leader that enable him to 
forge the unique and emotional relationship with his fol-
22 
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lowers that is so necessary for the emergence of the charis-
matic situation. It is essential to remember that one of 
Weber's central concerns was over the leader's ability to 
routinize his charisma. Routinization of charisma "is the 
process by which charisma is transformed from an extra-
ordinary and purely personal relationship (between leader 
and followers) into an established authority structure that 
is no longer necessarily dependent upon personal charisma 
qualification in the incumbent leader" (Entelis 1974:452). 
Charismatic leadership is thus seen as a transitory process, 
that if successful, would lead to the depersonalization of 
the authority structure in society. 
One of the most prominent critics of the concept 
. 
has been K. J. Ratnam who has maintained that the concept 
"has not in any substantial way improved our understanding 
of the problems it touches on . It The emphasis on the 
leader's personality, he maintains, serves only to obscure 
the critical component of the leader-follower relationship. 
This is due to the fact that the leader "gets his support 
largely from issues he is associated with, the grievances 
he seeks to put right and the manner in which he proposes 
to do so, and the time he chooses for making these issues 
and grievances the passionate concern of those whom he 
thinks will be his followers'' (Ratnam 1964:345). 
Ratnam seems, thus, to reJect a purely psychological 
or personality oriented explanation of the phenomenon. 
Issues, he maintains, are more important in determining the 
success or failure of the charismatic leader. Others have 
questioned the concept on the basis of the appropriateness 
of its removal from the sphere of religion. Both Karl 
Lowenstein and Carl Friedrich seem to contend "that the 
world of religion remains the fundamental locus of cha-
risma" (Lowenstein 1966:79). According to this view, cha-
rismatic leadership is essentially bound to a divine and 
transcendental dimension in which both the leader and his 
followers believe. Friedrich ties his criticism neatly to 
the questions of organization, power and leadership. The 
secular (charismatic!) leader, he claims, is immensely con-
cerned about organization and power. A true charismatic 
leader (i.e. the'founders of religion) is not. This is 
especially critical, he argues, since "charisma does not 
provide an adequate type of leadership, but only of power. 
Power is differentiated according to its source, leadership 
according to its function" (Friedrich 1961:3). 
24 
Others have criticized the concept on methodological 
as well as historical grounds. Typical of the methodolo-
gical criticism is that of Claude Ake who questions the 
notion of magnetism or appeal of the leader: 
To establish the presence of this condi-
tion empirically calls for a specialized form 
of research which the proponents of the theory 
of charismatic legitimation have not undertakeno 
One must insist on operational indices for 
identifying and measuring the extent of charis-
matic appeal because the minimal requirement 
for the validation of the theory of charismatic 
legitimation in any historical instance is that 
the leader be perceived as endowed with charisma 
by enough people to make charisma a critical 
instrument of 'social mobilization'" (Ake 1966:6). 
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This analytical difficulty must be counted among the con-
cept's greatest weaknesses. This can especially be seen 
when one considers that the wealth of literature on 
charismatic leadership is fundamentally counterbalanced by 
the dearth of operational research into the dynamic and 
analyzable "catalogue of the personal quality in charismatic 
leaders which give rise" to the charismatic situation. 
This is especially critical since many theorists, according 
to Ake, "assume without explication or empirical evidence 
that certain leaders of the new states possess charisma" 
(Ake 1966:5). 
The final, and perhaps the most profound, criticism 
of the concept is one that centers around the relative lack 
of a long term sense of history in the theory. Neither 
Weber, nor the students of his thought have been able to 
anchor the theory into a larger historical framework. What 
sort of historical transitions and movements have paved the 
way for the emergence of this form of authority relation-
ship? The question must be a central concern of every theo-
retical undertaking. Professor Peter Blau has noted this 
deficiency in Weber's concept in that it "encompasses only 
the historical processes that lead from charismatic movements 
to increasing rationalization and does not include an 
analysis of the historical conditions that give rise to 
charismatic eruptions in the social structure" (Blau 1963: 
128) . 
These by no means exhaust the long list of criti-
cisms directed at the concept of charismatic leadership. 
Of all the concept's weaknesses, however, the role it 
assigns to the followers is potentially the most damaging. 
To cast the followers in a static and secondary role is not 
only a dubious proposition; it is an anachronism to this 
age in which the people have been, on many occasions, 
ahead of their leaders. Yet, the concept seems to continu-
ously reappear in the writings of many a thoughtful social 
scientist. The question then becomes, why can we not 
discard the concept and look somewhere else for a better 
and more comprehensive explanatory tool? 
III -- Developmental Ideology 
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The traditional answer to the question regarding 
the persistent use of the concept of charismatic leadership, 
despite its obvious deficiencies, is simple if not simplis-
tic. According to this view, the concept is rather useful 
"in the context of a study of 'modernization and political 
development in ex-colonial 'new states'. Edward Shills, 
David Apter, and Dorothy and Ann Ruth Willner have all 
pointed its potential usefulness in this area 11 (Tucker 
1968:734). In this sense, the charismatic leader's mission 
is to bridge the gap between the decayed past and the yet 
undeveloped future and to provide some economic and social 
opportunities for his frustrated followers.* Edward Shills 
has, better than anyone else, articulated this strategy and 
need: 
The countries with underdeveloped 
economies are primarily peasant countries 
and their national unity is quite new and 
fragmentary. The uneducated classes are 
rooted mainly in local territorial and 
kinship groups; sometimes they are depen-
dents of feudal magnates to whom are 
directed whatever wider loyalties they 
have. They do not have the strong sense 
of nationality which drives the leaders 
of their country, who are often the creators 
of the nation and not merely of the new 
states. These leaders are strong and 
creative persons who have broken away from 
the bonds of the old order -- the bonds of 
kin and family and local territory. 
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Even when they claim to speak in behalf of the deeper 
traditions of those whom they would lead, they have departed 
from the actual traditions of the culture in which they 
originated. They are 'nationalized' and 'political' and 
therein lies their chief novelty. The maJority of the 
state, by contrast, lives in sometimes unthinking, sometimes 
obstinate, attachment to its traditional symbols. Most of 
its life is 'pre-national' and 'pre-political'" (Shills 1958: 
2) • 
Shills' analysis and observations of both the new 
states and their leadership is essentially accurate, 
*In his book on Rebel Leadership, James Downtown attempted 
to prove the psychological benefits that an individual 
could attain through his attachment to a charismatic 
leader. Malcolm X who has previously suffered from 
identity diffusion has developed intellectually to a 
point where he was able to perceive even the deficiencies 
of his leader. 
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although differences of degree do exist among the various 
nations in terms of their national consciousness. Differ-
ences of degree did exist, for example, between the Sudan 
and Egypt at the time of their independence. Although 
neighboring countries and sharing in history, language, 
and traditions, the Sudan and Egypt were not similar in 
terms of the extent of politicization or national conscious-
ness. However, his observation concerning the 'nationali-
zation and politicization' of the leadership is extremely 
accurate. Almost all of the leaders who have been labeled 
charismatic have had some contact with Western political 
and intellectual thought. Nkrumah's and Sukarno's foreign 
studies (in England, the United States, and the Netherlands) 
and Ghandi's studies in law have opened their eyes to a 
world of possibilities that would have been unthinkable 
had they remained within the physical and intellectual 
confines of their own cultures. 
The introduction of colonial institutions seems to 
undermine the authority of traditional leaderships. Thus 
the attainment of independence is usually accompanied by a 
political and institutional vacuum. Ann Ruth and Dorothy 
Willner have successfully described this process: 
"The basis of traditional authority, however was 
eroded by Colonialism and indigenous nationalism and the 
basis of legal authority was undermined by indigenous 
nationalism." (Willner and Willner, 1965:?0) The nation 
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has neither the authority of its traditional institutions 
nor the authority based on rules and bureaucratic directives. 
The Willners' description of this situation is instructive, 
"A climate of uncertainty and unpredictability is therefore 
a breeding ground for the emergence of charismatic leader-
ship." (Willner and Willner, 1965:81} 
The charismatic leader, at this juncture, has his 
task neatly cut for him. This consists of two things: 
A -- He must lead the way toward the legiti~ation 
of the state. This is essentially "a matter 
of getting the citizen to regard it as a 
genuine representative of his interests and 
therefore deserving his loyalty; it is to 
some extent a matter of making him think 
of the state as 'we' rather than 'they'." 
(Ake, 1966:6} It is only natural for a citizen 
who has learned to regard the state as an 
instrument and a symbol of foreign domination 
to show some hesitation in accepting its changed 
status as his own. This is especially true 
since the charismatic leader has often been 
forced to depend on a bureaucracy inherited 
from the colonial period with colonial atti-
tudes. 
B -- The charismatic leader is to affect normative 
changes resulting in the total transformation 
of the state. This is the dimension we 
called developmental ideology. He is often 
aware of the developmental gap between his 
people and those of industrialized countries, 
and thus bases a great portion of his appeal 
on the promise of deliverance to the promised 
land. 
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It is obvious that the the'ory of charismatic leader-
ship is strewn with deficiencies, both methodological and 
conceptual, but its relevance to studies of the new states 
of the third world is unquestionable. The "hardiness" wrote 
.Martin Spencer, "suggests that behind the various usages of 
the expression lies a significant social reality." (Spencer, 
1973:342) This social reality is political as well as 
economic, has its fundamental locus in the third world. That 
is the theory's last, but rich frontier. It is the oxygen 
tank that keeps Max Weber's greatest contribution afloat. 
And it is a largely untapped frontier. But only in the sense 
that the theory is a first step toward the understanding of 
the phenomenon of post-colonial leadership in these countries. 
Professor R.H. DekmeJian has proposed a Develop-
mental scheme, which he calls an historical-empirical type 
framework of general applicability, in which he attempts 
to delineate the general features of the charismatic pro-
gression. It is, we must remember, only a skeletal outline 
but it is one that attempts to incorporate the experience 
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of what ~e loosely terms third world charismatic leaderships. 
The scheme evolves along the following lines: 
1 -- A situation of acute social crisis characterized 
by tne pathological response of society to a breakdown of 
the existing mechanisms of conflict resolution. In such 
times irrational, schizophrenia-like disorientations occur 
creating a deep sense of psychological dependence and 
heightened expectations. 
2 -- The appearance of an exemplary personage with-
out whom the charismatic relationship will not begin. The 
initiation of the charismatic relationship depends on 
whether the leader's performance-message fits the crisis 
situation. Finally, the leader-follower interaction may 
be aborted if the leader is denied the opportunity to 
propagate and perform. 
3 -- The leader can now proceed to effect a value 
transformation on the basis of the legitimacy flowing from 
the nascent charismatic relationship. Increasingly he 
exercises a diffuse and intense influence over the normative 
orientations of the masses. Thus, the leader fills the 
value-belief vacuum created by the social crises with his 
own belief system or ideology as promulgated in his message. 
Indeed the charismatic relationship is a two-way process 
from which both leader and followers receive fulfillment 
and satisfaction. 
4 -- The final stage in the evolution of charismatic 
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authority is 'routinization'. The term denotes the leader's 
efforts to establish a new order based on the legitimacy 
derived from his charisma. The legitimacy popularly ascribed 
to these institutions flows not only from his heroic record 
and exemplary qualities, but more basically from the value 
transformation that he has caused to take place. (Dekmejian, 
1971:4-9) 
Shills, Willner and Dekmejian's attempt to view 
post-colonial leadership as charismatic raises some serious 
problems, however. Thus to say, as Shills did, that the 
leader's awareness of the need for development and the com-
paratively high degree of his "politicization" are sufficient 
to propel him into the charismatic sphere, is highly pro-
blematic. It is as though he was implying that one's degree 
of "Westernization" is equal to his charismatic potential. 
But more interesting, from a theoretical viewpoint, is 
Shills' awareness of the historical processes that dictate 
the elevation of certain individuals to leadership roles 
by virtue of their "novelty". It is not the leader's inner 
strength and heroic supernatural qualities that seem to be 
the determining factor of his charisma, but the demands of 
a certain historical and political situation. Similar 
criticism can be directed at Willner's conception of "a 
climate of uncertainty and unpredictability" as the breeding 
ground for this kind of leadership since it tends to see 
the nation's post colonial trauma as the critical prerequisite 
for charismatic leadership. 
Even DekmeJ1.an's methodologically rigorous model 
is built around assumptions such as the breakdown of 
conflict resolution mechanisms and whether the leader is 
allowed or "denied the opportunity to propagate". Both 
assumptions seem to imply that a vacuum is created as a 
result of the removal of the colonial apparatus and the 
national upheaval accompanying it. In all of these pre-
scriptions one is left with the impression that it is the 
demands of the situation and not the leader's qualities 
that are the more critical. 
This tendency among a number of Western writers 
to view charisma as a useful tool fo~ the explanation of 
leadership problems in most third world countries suffers 
from two main deficiencies: 
A -- As a conceptual descendant of the romantic 
view of leadership conveyed by Carlyle and accompanying 
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the rise of legendary European leaders such as Napoleon 
and Bismarck, it tends to locate the source of the leader's 
success "by reference to personality, will, or fate" and 
thus ignore the follower's interest and input into the 
process of mass mobilization. The image of the great 
leader battling the elements and emerging victorious 
against all odds is a dominant theme 1.n Western literature 
since the days of Caeser and Alexander the Great. 
But the lvorld 1.n which most third world leaders 
found themselves is radically different, and the contribu-
tions of the Indonesian people, for example, precede the 
appearance of President Sukarno. The same is true of 
Egypt where the struggle for independence has flourished 
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for at least 60 years prior to Nasser's appearance. Saad 
Zaghdool, the leader of the 1919 revolution, was a true 
hero to the Egyptian masses and many contemporary historians 
credit him with a magnetism and leadership ability superior 
to Nasser's. But the Egyptian people's frustration with 
their colonized status has reached the boiling point 
culminating only a few months before Nasser's revolution 
in fires and riots so violent that it was called "the Black 
Saturday". The harassment of British troops by patriotic 
groups, as well as the conviction within the Western world 
that the times of colonial expansion were doomed to an end, 
are among the factors that set the stage for the emergence 
of a strong native leadership. 
Similar conditions -- with varying degrees of 
intensity -- prevailed in India, Ghana and a host of other 
countries. All over the third world, millions of people 
were sacrificing their lives in a massive yearning for 
independence and dignity. The search for leaders who can 
symbolize and articulate these dreams was an integral part 
of the struggle. 
B -- 'I'he other flaw in this mode of analysis is the 
case with which it dismisses the leader's use of a variety 
of communication channels ranging from the radio and the 
movie screen to the book and the speaker's microphone~ 
35 
The speed and the efficiency with,which radio can spread 
the leader's speeches, or the capacity of the printing 
machine to turn out thousands of magazines and books 
designed to enhance his image have proven to be powerful 
weapons in the leader's attempt to mobilize the masses 
behind nis programs and obJectives~ This process has, in 
turn, created a situation in which the people's perception 
of their leader is not necessarily reflective of his true 
qualities. More often they respond to well-manufactured 
images that surround them from the radio speeches, on the 
glittering movie screens and from the pages of well-written 
pamphlets and newspapers. 
Dignity and independence are, usually, the two over-
riding themes of the post-colonial era, and the leader's 
image is often linked to both pursuits. Daniel Lerner, 
in the course of an extensive discussion of what he called 
Nasser's ucomrnunication strategy" observed that "His (Nasser} 
success in propagating the symbols of Arab Nationalism 
seems beyond question. The most impressive unifying force 
among Egyptians and 'Neutralist' Arabs today is the person-
ality of Nasser as reflected through Cairo's voice of the 
Arabs." (Lerner, 1958:216) 
Can we, then, call this kind of leader charismatic 
in the same sense that Weber intended? One can readily see 
the difference between the two types of leadership. For 
unlike Weber's charismatic leader, the post-colonial 
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third world leader is many times thrust onto the national 
stage as a result of national unrest and upheaval~ The 
disappearance of, or the struggle against the Colonial 
power is the vacuum that often sucks him into a leadership 
position. The emergence of a large number of leaders under 
such circumstances attests to the historical and situational 
contexts of this phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the fact the leader's staying power 
and the reverence in which he is held are largely based 
upon his total monopoly over society's varied communication 
channels, is a further testimony to the vast difference 
between the two kinds of leadership. Thus to call this 
type of leadership charismatic is to ascribe to him qualities 
that are neither inherent nor necessary to his leadership 
position. He is mostly not the possessor of supernatural 
or transcendental qualities. He is the creature of his age 
and the national circumstances, rather than the hero and 
great visionary described by Weber. 
It is because of this crucial difference that the 
charismatic leader is a concept alien to both our age and 
the historical forces that triggered the emergence of the 
contemporary third world leader. A more appropriate concept 
in describing this type of leader is to call him neo-
charismatic. Implied in this term is a recognition of the 
fact that the leader is linked to his followers by a 
substantially more intense relationship than other forms 
of leadership. A native leader who replaces the colonial 
administrator at the top is likely to be looked up to as 
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one who incorporates within himself those ideals most 
desired by his people. Centuries of colonial occupation tend 
to cast clouds of doubt and feelings of inferiority into the 
masses psyche. An effective and capable leader can, through 
acts of postures of defiance, do miracles as far as the 
i~provement of his people's self-image is concerned. 
It would be virtually inpossible to provide a neat 
and precise list of traits that characterize neo-charismatic 
leaders. Differences of milieu and of the context within 
which tl1e national struggle was conducted to be taken into 
account. What shall be listed, instead, are four features 
that seem to be common to the emergence and evolution of 
most such leaders: 
1 -- They tend to emerge in a situation of acute 
crisis and national distress. The leader need not be 
responsible for the initiation of the struggle, nor is he 
necessarily among the pioneering figures. Nasser's late-
comer status within the Egyptian national movement is a 
good example. 
2 -- The leader must be capable of proJecting him-
self as an impassioned articulator of the dreams and 
aspirations of the people. He is thus able to touch and 
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appeal to his people's sense of pride and dignity. Essen-
tially this is realized through coopting rival forces 
within the national movement and the creation of a struc-
ture of national consensus that revolves around the leader's 
policies and initiatives. The leader thus becomes the 
ultimate arbiter of broad objectives and nationally signi-
ficant trends. 
3 -- The leader is invariably supported by a viable 
power base such as a political party or a military organi-
zation on whose resources he is able to draw at critical 
junctures. The lone-ranger image created around many 
such leaders is a gross misrepresentation of what it takes 
to achieve total ascendancy. 
4 -- Last, ,but not least, is the leader's eventual 
monopoly over communication channels in society as a direct 
result of his ascendancy to power. Many references have 
been made to the use most nee-charismatic leaders make 
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of this monopoly, but it was rarely conceived as a critical 
element in the leader's arsenal. The intensity and effec-
tiveness with which the nee-charismatic leader is able to 
communicate his ideas can be either hindered or enhanced 
by such factors as culture, language, ethnic diversity or 
the mere availability of the machinery and expertise necessary 
to provide a comprehensive coverage reaching all the major 
sections of society. This, then, is the leader's main weapon 
in the process of the engineering of national consensus. As 
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such it is also responsible for the "special" and "intense" 
relationship the leader has with his followers. 
These features of neo-charismatic leadership by no 
means exhaust all of its characteristicso Rather, they are 
an attempt to capture those essential and universal features 
of the phenomenon in the tradition of Max Weber's concept 
of the ideal type. To state the matter thusly is to admit 
that the emphasis put on one element under a certain leader 
is not always equal to the emphasis applied to another 
leader. 
The next two chapters will thus be devoted to a 
discussion of the manner in which these features apply to 
Nasser's brand of neo-charismatic leadership. It will be 
argued that his leadership has greatly rested on a thorough 
exercise of the power of mass persuasion through the mani-
pulation of the various communication channels. To suggest 
that communication has played a critical part in Nasser's 
ascendancy is, of course, not to deny the power of a military 
base or the impact of a fearsome oppression system. It is 
merely intended to highlight the significance of an element 
rarely recognized in the analysis of neo-charismatic leader-
ship. 
CHAPTER III 
Communication in a Charismatic Setting 
The mystery surrounding the rise of charismatic leaders 
continues to baffle the social scientists. The sociological 
and the psychological arguments have so far been the most 
pro~iment explanations as the last chapter indicates. There 
is, of course, no doubt that deteriorating social conditions 
and the leader's inner strength and superior qualities are 
among tne most crucial factors in our attempt to explain this 
phenomenon. Factors other than these two may yet be uncovered. 
Thus, the central thesis of the study attempts to add one 
more explanatory variable. Persuasive communication, in all 
its aspects and form, can provide part of the explanation 
for the rise of at least one charismatic leader. The phe-
nomenal increase in the use of communication channels and 
methods in Egypt, under the direction of the late President 
Nasser, have been noted by many observers of the Egyptian 
scene. No one, however, has attempted to explain the degree 
to which this fact (i.e. the extensive use of communication 
chanc.els) has contributed to Nasser's rise or his survival 
as the viable leader of his country. 
All charismatic leaders have to some degree used the 
coITu.~unication channels under their disposal, but the effect 
of this use is governed occasionally by factors over which 
the leader has very little control. Three such factors are: 
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A) The number of languages spoken by the population$ 
Rare, indeed, are the situations in which the 
whole nation speaks the same language. 
B) The number of communication channels available 
to the leader and the extent of their use. 
Thus if the nation happens to speak more than 
one language, and if further, the number of 
papers and radios are small, then it can be 
assUP1ed that the leader is at some disadvantage. 
C) Pi~ally, there is the question of cultural and 
linguistic unity and diversity. The extent to 
which a leader can emotionally s and mobilize 
~he population is influenced by cultural symbols 
and myths. The overall cultural milieu and heri-
0age is extremely important in this respect~ 
Having prefaced this part of the study with these 
observations we shall now begin the exploration of the 
nature, methods and channels of cornmunication, especially 
persuas coITLmunication. Persuasive coITLmunication, however, 
is mediated and influenced by the interplay of the national 
language and its cultural milieu. Both of these aspects 
will be discussed first in a universal framework and, then 
later on, in terms speci c to the Arab culture and language. 
I -- Of Communication and Persuasion 
Very few concepts in the social sciences have been de-
fined in as many ways as coID.t~unication is. In an investi-
gation of the Concept of CowJUunication, Professor Frank E. 
X. Dance outlines 15 different definitions addressing 
fifteen different themes. Thus one definition stresses 
the the~e of interaction while another addresses a verbal 
or a symbols theme. Another definition, yet, emphasizes 
the cb2nnel or the means of sending Messages (Dance 1970: 
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204-208). There is, however, a wide agreement on at least 
two components to any definition that aspires to command the 
attention of a significant number of social scientists. 
Communication, it is argued, is a process. It occurs over 
time and through space. is, other words, continuous 
because it is essential to the maintenance of the species; 
Communication is also perceived as intentional. No one 
communicates without a purpose. Bernard Berelson stressed 
the processual component when he stated that "Communication: 
the transmission of information, ideas, emotions, skills, 
etc., by the use of symbols words, pictures, figures, 
graphs, etc. It is the act or process of transmission that 
is usually called communicationn (Berelson 1964:254). 
Gerald A. Millers ssed the int ional theme "In the 
main, communication has as its central interest those be-
havioral situations in which a source transmits a message 
to a receiver (S) with conscious intent to affect the 
latter's behaviors" (Miller 1966:92). Seen from this per-
spective, the purpose of communication becomes change in 
attitudes and eventually change in behavior. This, then, 
is a process whose ultimate goal is to promote changes and 
adaptations in human behavior compatible with the demands 
and desires of both the sender and rece Wilbur Schramm 
emphasized this further when he wrote that "whenever change 
occurs in human society, there communication flows .... 
For is important to remember that communication is not 
43 
something that has a life of its own; it is something 
people do. It is the fundamental process of society, the 
way that people relate to each othern (Schramm and Lerner 
1967:6). Harold Lasswell's model of the communication 
process seems to be the basis for this view of communication. 
The model is summarized in a question form: Who says what 
to whom in what channel with what effect? (Smith 1966:541). 
This fo~~ulation is especially strong in that it asserts the 
role and credibility of the communicator; points out the 
signi:icance of the message content; includes the receiver 
or audience; and finally inquires about the changes effected. 
The search for the effect is an implicit recognition 
of one of cornmunic ion's most fundamental goals which is 
persuasion. If adding knowledge and increasing awareness 
is one central goal of all comrnunic ion acts, then per-
suasion is the other. Aristotle, indeed, defined the study 
of rhetoric ( conununication) as the search for nall the 
availaole means of persuasion" (Berlo 1960:7). The question 
thus becomes, what is persuasion? How does it differ --
and if it does -- from other aspects of communication? 
Part of the answer to this question lies in whether one 
perceives there to be a re difference between two concepts: 
Rhetoric and persuasion. To be sure, many believe that the 
t1.·10 concepts are one and the same thing. Paul N. Campbell 
perceives no difference, n1 1 ve defined Rhetoric as the 
theory and practice of persuasion by reasoned discourse." 
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Facts, he claims "are persuasive; there is nothing cold, 
or remote, or unfeeling about them" (Campbell 1972:15-18). 
This view, extreme as it may sound, is by no means foreign 
to the confusion that prevails regarding these concepts. 
The distinction is, nevertheless, drawn by the majority 
of soci scientists. Bettinghaus responded to the view 
that all communicatioa is persuasion by pointing out that 
"in order to be persuasive in nature, a communication 
situation must involve a conscious attempt by one individual 
to change the behavior of another individual or groups of 
individuals through the transmission of some messageir 
(Bettinghaus 1967:13). Three examples involving communi-
cation and resulting in behavior changes were provided. 
These examples, he declared, were not persuasive because 
they lacked an intentional dimension. The differences be-
tween rhetoric and persuasion is a necessary one to observe 
according to Condon. He views rhetoric "as the speaker's 
conscious use of symbols, spoken and unspoken, to elicit 
from his intended or assumed audience the response he 
desires." Persuasion, on the other hand., involves "changing 
attitudes or belie , while rhetorically a speaker may 
seek only to reaffirm what is already delivered, demon-
strate his legitimacy, or otherwise symbolically express 
what is expected of him" (Condon and Yousef 1975:232). 
Essential to this distinction is the view that rhetoric 
may elicit temporary and limited changes. These are changes 
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that are geared to the moment, but they are always within 
the secure boundaries of the status quo. Persuasion, on the 
other hand, is geared to more profound and subtle changes. , 
The goal seems to be a radical re-arrangement of the audi-
ence's social reality. 
Another view of the relationship between persuasion and 
rhetoric, and one that seems to be concerned with the subject 
matter more than it is with the effect, is the one advanced 
by Donald C. Bryant. nRhetoric, 11 he maintains, 11is the 
rationale of informative and sensory discourse. All its 
other meanings are partial or morally colored derivatives 
frora that primary meaning. . . 11 (Aly and Aly 1973: 70). 
Rhetoric, thus viewed, is somewhat similar to a bird: one 
wing is suasory, persuasive and the other is informative 
and expository. 
Of the two wings we are essentially concerned with 
one, not to the total exclusion of the other, but in as 
much as it has been used by charismatic leaders in their 
effort to promote their integrative mission on the "road 
to modernity." It is plainly difficult to say how impor-
tant persuasive communication has been to the charismatic 
leader. The difficulty lies, of course, in the fact that 
communication is only one variable among many that ought 
to be considered in any rational discussion of the variables 
that go into the discussion of contemporary political lead-
ership in third world countries. But the temptation and 
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the evidence are irresistable. The survival of Nasser's 
charismatic leadership, if only till his death, when con-
trasted with the disappearance of charismatics such as Ahmed 
Sukarno of Indonesia or Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana must in 
part be attributed to this effective, if not always correct, 
use of the various means of persuasive communication at his 
disposal. 
What, then, are the factors that one must consider in 
an attempt to understand persuasive communication? These 
factors can be depicted at two different levels. First, 
one must in some manner address the cultural dimension. 
The emphasis in our case is on the interplay between a cul-
tural rhetorical tradition and the known features of its 
langauge(s). Fortunately our theatre of interest has only 
one language: namely Arabic. Secondly, sufficient atten-
tion must also be paid to the broad category of the means 
and vehicles of persuasive communication. We are here 
concerned with those criteria contributing to the success 
of the individual communicator on the one hand, and those 
channels used by the charismatic communicator in propagating 
his message. 
II -- "The" Language and Its Culture 
Our view of language and the functions it serves 
has gone through some drastic revisions in the last half 
century. Previously, language has been treated as a kind 
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of necJtra2. medium through which ideas and thoughts were 
e:xpraessed. Linguis't Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin 
Wnorf had a different view, a radical view to be correct. 
Language, they maintained: 
11is not merely a more or less systematic 
inventory of the various items of experience 
~vhich seem relevant to the indi victual, as 
is so often naively assumed, but is also 
a self-contained, creative symbolic organi-
zation, which not only refers to experience 
largely acquired without its help but 
actually defines experience for us by 
reason of its formal completeness and 
because of our conscious projection of 
its i~plicit expectations into the field 
of experience" (Condon ~nd Fathi 1975:171). 
Language, as they see it, is not only a carrier of ideas 
a~d thoughts, it helps shape them. Reality as we see it 
trans~itted by language, beeomes colored by language and 
i!lli~e~sely influenced by it. Man's thought processes are 
also directly influenced by the medium of their articu-
lation. Lev. S. Vygotsky gave prompt expression to this 
mode of analysis when he asserted that 11 Thought and language 
which reflect reality in a way different from that of per-
ception, are the key to the nature of human consciousness. 
Words play a central part not only in the development of 
thought but in the whole historical growth of consciousness 
as a whole. A word is a microcosm of human consciousness 11 
(Vyg::>tsky 1962:168). 
But if the language is so central to man's thought 
processes and to his consciousness, then it can be argued 
that language is even more critical to nationalist ideologies. 
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For as we contemplate ~he process of decolonization in 
many a third world country, we are bound to observe the 
vacuum it leaves b~hind. Part of the vacuum has unfortu-
nately been related to the lack of cohesion in most of 
these countries due to many factors; economic, political, 
social and cultural. Cultural cohesiveness and political 
integration are immensely hampered by the lack of a common 
medium of expression. One of history's most brilliant 
students, Arnold Toynbee, is impressed by the relationship 
language has to nationalism. He remarked that rr • the 
criterion of nationality has of~en been found in the shib-
boleth of language" (Toynbee 1935:536). This fact underlies 
much of the emphasis in many third world countries on the 
language question. Much of Africa, for example, is either 
adopting or arguing for the adoption of Swahili as the 
national language. 
Belief in the nation, in its viability and in the 
strength of its fabric, is language-dependent. Daniel Katz 
articulated the social underpinnings of this argument when 
he insisted that masses are tied into national integration 
''through their emotional investment in system symbols" 
(Fishman 1972:54). Nationalism attempts to strengthen those 
bonds and build those bridges that tie the past to the 
present, and hopefully provide a vision of or a goal for the 
future. In this cementing process, language plays a most 
vital role. Seen from this historical and dynamic 
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perspective, nationalism "needs group symbols that are more 
evocative of the past then unyieldingly anchored (or anchoring) 
to it; more indicative of uniqueness than disablingly mes-
merized by it 11 (Fishman 1972:55). The close and intimate 
identity between a people and its language may have an in-
fluence on the modal personality of that people. Nowhere 
has tnis argument been so compellingly argued as it has been 
in the relationship of Arabic to the Arab people. In his 
revealing book on The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, H. Z. 
Nuseibeh, contends that 11 the role of Arabic in the life 
history of the Arabs ... is [to be] the register of their 
creativeness, a symbol of their unity, and an expression of 
their mental and artistic aptitudes" (Nuseibeh 1956:69). 
Arabic has the further characteristic of being woven into the 
religious fabric of Islam. The affinity between the religion 
and the language is so profound for "religion was as much 
the conveyor of the language as the language was the con-
veyor of the religion'' (Fishman 1972:142). France's most 
vigorous effort to cut the umbilical cord that tied Algeria 
to the rest of the Arab world was mainly centered on replac-
ing the Arab culture by the French, ~specially in attempting 
to reake French the only spoken and written language in the 
country. It was only in the religious schools where the 
Holy Koran was taught that Arabic was spoken, and Algeria's 
drive to 11 authenticize her culture and personality is con-
centr&ted in the area of bringing Arabic back to lts previous 
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prominence" (Fishman 1968:137-139). 
Arabic has been somewhat hampered by the divergence 
between the classical form and the colloquial forms used 
in contemporary Arab countries. Classical Arabic has been 
accused of being time-bound and rather inflexible in the 
face of a new age almost completely immersed in the demands 
of a technological culture. Professor Jacques Berque, one 
of the West's most leading authorities on Arab culture, 
noted this difficulty and strongly hinted at the emerging 
linguistic solution. 
"Through the press, the radio, and the ever more fre-
quent contacts between Arabs of different speech, the so-
called 'modern' Arabic language has come into being: what 
I call Median Arabic, arabiya wusta, mediating between 
nations, and between letters and life" (Berque 1964:202). 
The influence language exerts on the cognitive field 
of the individual has been noted not only by Whorf and 
Sapir. Others such as McCluhan and Innis have further stressed 
and emphasized this aspect. The strong tendency in the 
Arabic language to shape and m?ld its subject's view of 
the world has been the stimulus to a vigorous controversy. 
In one of the earlier attempts to apply the analytical tools 
of social psychological explanation to this area, E. Shouby 
stated that Arabic induces in the Arab personality "general 
vagueness of thought; overemphasis on the psychological 
significance of the linguistic symbols at the expense of their 
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meani~gs; stereotyped emotional responses; over-assertion 
and exaggeration; and two levels of life'' (Shouby 1951:291). 
Berger, Gibb and Patai share this point of view with 
varying degrees of emphasis. The Words vs. Action dichotomy 
is especially pronounced in Ralph Patai's appraisal of the 
power Arabic exercises over -che individual's mind. "No 
language I kn.ow" he contends "comes even.near to Arabic in 
its poxer of rhetoricism, in its ability to penetrate be-
neath and beyond intellectual comprehension directly to 
tne e~otions and make its impact upon them. Once the 
inte~tion of doing something is verbalized, this verbal 
formul2tion itself leaves in the mind of the speaker the 
impression that he has done something about the issue on 
hand, w~ich in turn psychologically reduces the importance 
of following it up by actually translating the stated in-
tentio~ into action" (Patai 1973:48). The implications of 
such an argumen-c, especially when pushed to their logical 
conclusion, is that the Arabs are incapable of action. 
This, of course, is contradictory to the historical record. 
But the tendency affiong powerless peoples to substitute 
words for actions is undeniable, and the colorful nature 
of Arabic can only reinforce such a tendency. 
E. T. Prothro, a longtime resident-observer of Arab 
cultu~e anj psychology, sees the question in terms that 
are rar less evaluative and dramatic. Using Osgood's 
"serna:'.'ltic differentialn technique for the study of language 
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and cognition, two groups of Arab students (The American 
University of Beirut) were nsorted on an 11-point scale 
of favorableness-unfavorableness, general statements which 
might be taken as descriptive of any group of people. The 
judgements of the Arab students were then compared with the 
previously known judgements of American students (The Grice-
Remmers generalized attitude scale)." At the end of his 
study, Prothro reaches the conclusion that "It seems jus-
tified to infer from our results that . American 
students are more given to understatement than are Arab 
students" (Prothro 1955:9)0 
This tendency toward repet ion and emphasis is 
espe ally pronounced in public speech. In his national-
ization of the Suez Canal Company speech, President Nasser 
insisted that ''We must always be cautious of the tricks of 
exploiters, imperialists and the stooges of imperialists . 
We shall not permit the war-mongers, the imperialists and 
slave-traders to have a grip upon us," etc. (Prosser 1973: 
93). In comparing that speech to Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden's speech in response, Dr. M. Suleiman found that 
Nasser's contained 74 instances of assertive or exaggera-
tive words to Eden's 49. In repetition Nasser scored 25 
to Eden's O (Prosser 1973=93). 
It is worthwhile, however, to remember that both the 
Shouby observations and the Prothro study were conducted 
either in the late 1940's or in the early 1950's. Aware-
ness of these tendencies and serious remedial attempts have 
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resulted from the efforts of Arab intellectuals especially 
in the last 15 years. But the change, affecting both the 
tone and the content, has not diminished in any drastic 
way the political and emotional significance of the language. 
For as Dr. H. Sharabi observes nin the political life, 
Arabic is a most effective instrument of influence and per-
suasion11 (Sharabi 1966:93). This effectiveness Dr. Sharabi 
speaks of is further enhanced by the fact that Arabic is 
spoken by more than 100 million people spread over nearly 
20 countries. An ambitious political leader, in this case 
Nasser, is able through expert use of the various instru-
ments of persuasive communication to spread his influence 
far beyond the borders of his country. Of particular 
relevance, then, is an attempt to explore and point out 
the various channels and methods used in 
persuasive comi~unication. 
s process of 
III -- Persuasion: Instruments and Strategies 
A significant part of Daniel Lerner's widely read 
book, The Passing of Traditional Society, is partly devoted 
to an inquiry into the impact of mass communication on the 
developnental patterns in the Middle East. Lerner contends 
that the prevailing communication system is a combination 
of Oral and Mass Media. This apparently is suited to a 
transitional society in which the individual acquires a 
11dif rent latent structure of aptitudes and attitudes 
(Lerner 1958:72). The transitional individual sees a 
n 
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different, less restrictive, more participant oriented 
world than his traditional peer does. David Riesman adds 
a more immediate dimension to the concept, for the "Tran-
sitional11 he maintains, "is defined as one who attends to 
the mass media, but cannot read" (Lerner 1958:72). This 
oral/media combination calls for the intensive application 
of certain channels and methods of communication. The fact 
that certain means are used more intensively does not, 
however, suggest th~ total exclusion of others. 
To a large extent our choice of channels to be in-
cluded in a study of this nature must be determined by what 
we understand channel to be. David K. Berlo defined 
channel simply as 11 a medium, a carrier of messages" (Berlo 
1960:31). The message-centered meaning of a channel 
allows us to explore the large variety of channels used 
by the charismatic leader in a manner more suitable to, 
and reflective of, prevailing social conditions. Most 
third world countries, especially ones that are culturally 
and physically capable of it, employ a multiple channel 
strategy. E. Lloyd Sommerland saw the need for this method. 
"In a developing country, press, radio, television and 
film are more complimentary than competitive. One may be 
more effective when used in conjunction, the one reinforc-
ing the other. Hence, in the great campaigns undertaken 
by a government .. the greatest impact will be achieved 
and the fastest progress made if all available methods of 
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comnunication are used concurrently" (Sommerland 1966:66). 
This is all the more true since communication environment 
is rigidly controlled in most of these countries. But the 
predominant form of communication in developing countries 
is still "by word of mouth. 11 Opinion leaders are extremely 
crucial to this process even in industrialized countries. 
As Lazarsfeld and Berelson have discovered "ideas often 
flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from 
them "to the less active sections of the population" (Prosser 
1973:122). This formulation, commonly known as the Two-
Sten ?low Theory, is remarkable in its recognition of the 
fact that people are not as easily swayed and manipulated 
as was previously assumed. Elihu Katz identified its 
central premise in that it 11 stressed the functioning of 
interpersonal relations as communication networks and as 
sources of social pressure or support" (Prosser 1973:123). 
The ce~trality of the opinion leader to the communication 
process in what Lerner called Oral/Media societies lies at 
the heart of his previously mentioned work. 
' These two channels, media and opinion leaders, do not 
exhaust the leader's communication arsenal. It is with 
such a ~road view of the process that we shall presently 
pursue a ~ore comprehensive survey of the means and chan-
nels opened to the charismatic leader in a manner commen-
surate with their vitality to the communication process. 
1 -- Oral Communicators: The significance of this 
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group cannot be overemphasized especially in view the 
fact that the Arabs have always exhibited an outward 
orient ion to their existence. M. Berger in his famous 
book, The Arab World Today, stated this thes . "Throughout 
the history, despite the recent introduction of Western 
political forms, Arab communities have been col ctions of 
groups rather than of individuals. The family and the tribe 
have been the soc units through which the individual has 
related himself to others ... " (Berger 1962:33). Cafes, 
public gatherings, religious affairs and Bazaars are tne 
central focus of village life. The story teller, the Friday 
sermon, the rumor, as well as the respected member of the 
community are only a few among the oral sources and inter-
preters communication in such a setting. 
These local activists are at the hub of the communi-
cation network and termine, though not often collectively, 
the kinds of information and messages filtered to the 
population. Ithi De Sola Pool summed up the process, "It 
has been fairly well established in a variety of cultures 
that whereas the mass media serve effectively to diffuse 
information without confirming their impulse by checking 
with an opinion leader with whom they are in face-to-face 
contact" (De Sola Pool:94). As in the other forms of 
communication discussed here, the extent to which this form 
has been used to the leader's advantage will be spelled 
out in the case study contained in the next chaptero Suf-
fice it to say here, that no comprehensive understanding 
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of the corn.munication dynamics in the Middle East is com-
plete without a full appreciation of this dimension. 
2 -- The Mass Media: The Arab Society with its extro-
vert and outward orientation has been a fairly easy con-
quering ground for the mass media. Berger remarked that 
lfThe media of communication and their use have grown out 
of proportion to the population increase" (Berger 1962:399), 
In this area, radio has been the dominant and most used 
form of the mass media. This is largely due to the fact 
that radio is 111,,;rell adapted 11 to the circumstances of a 
poor country (Goldthorpe 1975·208). Illiteracy has been 
the nain obstacle facing the press, but radio suffers none 
from this difficulty. As Nasser explained it: "It is 
true that most of our people are still illiterate. But 
politically that counts far less than it did 20 years 
ago . Radio has changed everything" (Adams 1971:587). 
Radio, then, is an instrument of communication whose 
utility is undi~inished for illiterate societies. The 
UNESCO statistics are most instructive in this regard. 
Their 1968 uworld Radio and Television 11 lists Egypt as 
having 4,260,000 radio receivers. By comparison, South 
Korea and Turkey had 1,400,000 and 2,803,000. The figures 
are interesting, especially when we realize that both 
Turkey and South Korea have a higher rate of literacy and 
a higher per capita income (UNESCO 1968). 
In Egypt, newspaper circulation "is now a quarter more 
to over do:J.ble what. it was a few years agorr according to 
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Berger (Berger 1962:399). Television, book production and 
cinema have also increased both in volume and circulation. 
This has resulted in a new and volatile situation in which 
politics are "beginning to replace traditional rites, at 
least in the Egyptian village ... " in the words of Berque 
(Berque 1964:15-16). Lerner saw mass communication media 
as the instrument used to"arrive at consensus" without the 
active participation of the people. 
3 -- The Leader's Rhetorical Skill: Public speaking 
is a revered art in the Middle East. Its roots are deeply 
dug in Arab history and tradition. Arab speech relies 
rather heavily on gesture and on hidden meaning which is 
"conveyed rather than directly or precisely expressed, and 
, 
is always couched in terminology that evokes emotional 
rather than rational responses" (Sharabi 1966:93). Myth 
and symbols play a large part in this form of communication. 
Gesture, vigorous and well-timed, is essential and widely 
used. But effective use of the language is the ultimate 
criteria upon which a good speaker is judged. In all of 
these aspects, public speech is culturally determined. Com-
menting on President J. Nyrere's speech style, John C. 
Condon relays the following, "Nyrere would begin by chuck-
ling; the audience would chuckle back. Soon a laughing 
relationship would be established, a form of rapport quite 
unlike anything observed in Western speech making .. 
He does voices -- farmers, women, whatever; he jokes, he 
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gets ang~y, he teases, but he maintains his dignity and 
the line of argument is tight" (Condon and Fathi 1975:236). 
4 -- The Educational System and Idea Dissemination: 
New textbooks carrying the leader's message are introduced 
at all levels of education, and ones in disagreement are 
disposed of. New subjects are introduced concentrating 
mainly on propagating the leader's message and world view. 
Excerpts from the leader's speeches as well as readings 
stressing the nation's glorious past and the changes 
brougnt about by the leader are part of a program of 
nna-cional education.tr 
~herever the citizenry may turn for information, 
entertainment, work, education or mere face-to-face en-
counters it is invariably surrounded by a communication 
system designed for mass persuasion. Richard R. Fagen in 
a book entitled Politics and Communication, stated that: 
"Every ~onceivable channel in the society is at the ser-
vice of the elite in this effort. The mass media, the 
schools, the labor unions are all used to blanket the 
countryside with approved information and exhaustion . 
All the human and technological apparatus controlled 
by the leadership is designed to achieve maximum public 
coverage and effectiveness. The effort is continuous, 
honogeneous, and pervasive" (Fagen 1966:32-33). 
CHAPTER IV 
The Formative Years 
Gamal Abdel Nasser was born at Alexandria on January 
15, 1918, the eldest son of a post office worker from Beni 
Mor. Beni Mor bears the name of the village and the Arab 
tribe that inhabits it. In Arabic, Beni Mor means ''the 
bitter ones," as Robert St. John points out in the opening 
chapter of his book, The Boss (St. John 1960:4). 
The Egypt in which Nasser was born was anything but 
a happy place. Ruled by the Mohammed Ali dynasty, it was 
completely expropriated as a British protectorate in 1914. 
Prior to that it was always ruled by foreign powers: 
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Kurdish, Turkish, 
French and now the British. Nor was the dynasty of Mohammed 
Ali to claim any Egyptian ancestry, for they were of 
Albanian background. 
Since their occupation of Alexandria in 1882, the 
-
British according to Anthy Nutting "refrained from initiating 
any programme of long-term development except where 
Britain's strategic interests were involved. Consequently, 
education of agrarian reform were neglected: learning and 
land ownership remained the privilege of the predominantly 
Turkish upper classes" (Nutting 72:5). 
Political unrest and social fragmentation were the 
most visible signs of popular discontent. Ironically, 
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this ~as also a period of rising expectations: an Egyptian 
eli~e trained in French and Egyptian universities was 
making noises about independence and national dignity. 
More than one political party pretending to represent this 
sentiment were formed. Of these parties, however, only 
nAlYai'dn was able to make a significant national impact. 
The le of the Alwafd party, Saad Zaghloul, was also 
the leader of the 1919 revolution that articulated and 
carried fu~ther than any other movement Egypt's desire for 
indepe~de~ce. Professor Lacouture c led Zaghloul the 
"father of the people" (Lacouture 1973:14) and his party, 
Alwafd, -.•Jas tne first to gairt "a decisive victory in the 
elections ~hich followed in 1924'' (Nutting 1972:9). 
However, the death of Saad Zaghloul in 1927 removed 
from the political stage the one man capable of providing 
all t~e people with a leader around whom to unify. 
Dissatisfaction with traditional political parties 
and thei~ seening inability to accomplish the national 
goals and dreams gav~ birth to a plethora of highly moti-
vated and tightly organized movements. Most famous among 
these noverrients is the Moslem Brotherhood which sought "in 
the name of Islam that Egypt and the Nile Valley be purified 
of a foreign occupation" (Nutting 1972:11). The Brother-
hood appealed to the religious sentiments of the people, 
and was able to gather around it the alienated and the 
diss isfied segments of the society. Convinced that tra-
ditional political approaches were fruitless, the Brotherhood 
62 
engaged in violent attacks against British bases and other 
symbols of foreign occupation. This has apparently 
exacerbated the atmosphere of popular unrest and carried 
the struggle against the British to a new pinnacle. 
Nasser -- still a high school student -- felt the 
weight and the danger of this situation and wrote to a 
friend in 1935, "Today the situation is critical and Egypt 
is in an impasse. It seems to me that the country is 
dying. Despair is great. Who can end it? 11 (Stephens 1971: 
34). Student demonstrations became a daily occurrence, 
but as was the case with party and militant organizations: 
they produced little effect. It was this realization that 
guided the decisions of many a young man to look for the 
army as an instrument of national salvation. The army's 
decision to lower the gates of admission policy to the 
military academy, and the process of revitalization of the 
armed forces announced by the government -- with Britain's 
acquiescence -- provided Nasser and his colleagues with the 
opportunity to fulfill their ambition. 
Upon his admission to the academy Nasser met other 
cadets who shared his convictions. The circle of the dis-
satisfied grew larger, and the faint features of a revo-
lutionary organization called "The Free Officers 11 became 
visible (Lacouture 1973:57). Next came the Palestinian 
war of 1948. The humiliation heaped on the Arab armies 
due to ineffective leadership, bad and useless arms 
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triggered among these young officers feelings of profound 
resentment. Anwar Sadat, Egypt's contemporary leader, 
recounted rather eloquently this experience, "The humilia-
tion, frustration and anger aroused by the incompetence 
of the men who had led Egypt to defeat instead of victory, 
provoked a passionate desire to overthrow a regime which 
had once again demonstrated its complete impotence" (Sadat 
1957:109). 
The strains of a defeated army, corrupt bureaucracy, 
foreign occupation and intolerable social conditions grew 
worse. Rioting and other mainifestations of dissatisfac-
tion became more intense until Cairo was literally burned 
on what becam2 known as the Black Saturday of January 26, 
1952. "The chosen targets," according to R. Stephens, 
"symbolized the hated alliance of pashas and foreigners 
... 700 or more buildings burnt down, smashed or looted, 
as the crowds raged through the streets unchecked'' (Stephens 
1972:101). From tben on things took their worst turn as 
King Farouk kept appointing and dismissing one prime min-
ister after the other. Nasser and his young cohorts saw 
the writing on the wall, and they struck promptly and 
swiftly on the 23rd of July 1952. Soon after that, serious 
problems began to confront the young officers. 
Lacking recognition and legitimacy within the 
general population, they enlisted the help of a man known 
for ~is integrity and professionalism both within the armed 
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forces and on a national level. Thus General Mohammed 
Naguib was introduced as the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil's leader and eventually the president of the republic. 
Apparently, Nasser intended the General's role to be that 
of a titular figure. But the people seemed to have developed 
a genuine affection for the amiable and confident general. 
And he, in turn, saw their affection as an indication of 
confidence and a mandate to rule since he has the exper-
ience lacking in the young officers. A long and protracted 
struggle for power ensued. Nasser, jealous of the general's 
popularity and fearful of its consequences, began his 
first series of maneuvers to eliminate the man he intended 
to be only a "figurehead." 
The struggle against the beloved General was vastly 
,, 
different from the conspiracy against a universally disliked 
government. Professor Jean Lacouture outlined the obstacles 
Nasser now faced: 
"In the beginning he had almost everything 
against him: the people, who were in love with 
Naguib, the majority of the army, which had 
rallied behind the general; the foreign embassies, 
who were banking on the smiling general ... ; 
all the political parties, from the Wafd to the 
Brethern (Muslim) and the Communists; and finally 
the propertied class" (Lacouture 1973:134). 
The first episode of this conflict became known as a result 
of the orders Nasser gave to stop the activities of the 
Moslem Brotherhood. But the Brotherhood was far too power-
ful and organized to acquiesce. General Naguib's sympa-
thetic attitude toward the Brotherhood's plight as well as 
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his insistence on the restoration of democratic institu-
tions brought about his first offer of resignation. The 
news of the resignation triggered large "demonstrations in 
favor of the general staged by Cairo University students 
(and other national groups) who protested against army rule 
and called for elections and a constitutional democracyr' 
(Nutting 1972:61). 
ser and those of his colleagues who may have only 
been happy to rid of the general, became aware as 
a result of the national uprise on his behalf that they 
have rr1ade a grave mistake. In Nutting' s words, nFor a 
mo~e~~, therefore, there was nothing that Nasser could do 
except concede victory to Naguib" (Nutting 1972:61). The 
general returned to the presidency riding a wave of unpre-
cedented popularity. However, at the same moment that 
Nasser was all but cone defeat, alternative plans and 
new ~aneuvers to oust the general were already underway. 
Naguib \•ras obvious the victor "yet one by one the men 
who had helped him win were now going to be punished'' (St. 
John 1960:170). Many of those who demonstrated on the 
general's behalf were being quietly rounded up while he 
was o~ a visit to the Sudan. 
TJ:his uas the tip of the iceberg. Underneath it, 
however, Nasser was putting the last touches on a compli-
cated, but devious series of actions designed to undermine 
the general once and for 1. To begin with, the two most 
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11 symbolic 11 positions of president and prime minister were 
handed to the general. As such he was put in the awkward 
position of ultimate responsibility. Upon assuming the 
mantJe of power in 1952, the army had promised the Egyptian 
people concrete reforms in the political system designed 
to rid it of its corrupt leaderships and practices. Since 
Naguib has become identified in the popular mind with the 
defense of democratic practices and institutions, Nasser 
proceeded to turn the general's advantage into his disaster. 
Thus on March 22, 1954, the Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC) under Nasser's instigation ''adopted a resolution 
promising an end to military rule by July 24, restoration 
of political parties, and free elections for a constituent 
assembly to elect a president" (Dekmejian 1971:30). To 
the man in the street this meant a return to conditions 
they were hoping to be reformed, accompanied by the reap-
pearance of corrupt politicians. It also meant that this 
is the will and desire of General Naguib since he is the 
head of the RCC and the government as well as the dissolu-
tion of the Council. 
This action -- the end of the revolution -- was one of 
Nasser's boldest maneuvers and one that provides a definite 
clue to his conspiratorial mind. For as these actions 
were announced, Nasser's men were convincing the labor 
unions as well as the army that the execution of these 
measures desired by the General spelled the end of their 
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drearis for reform. Lacouture described the results. "In-
stigated from above, a general strike was declared. The 
entire city, consumed with passion and infiltrated with 
paid provocateurs, whirled about in near-madness. Columns 
of demonstrators waved Nasserist banners eulogizing the 
Council of the Revolution, while other protesters shouted, 
1 DoHn ·with the basic freedoms! 111 (Lacouture 1973: 137). This 
also ~arked the first time that Nasser resorted to the use 
of comrJ.unication channels as tools in his political struggles. 
This consisted of planting rumors at all national levels; 
speeches and press conferences by his colleagues such as 
the minis-cer of 11national guidance"; and finally the pub-
lication of reports concerning "telephone conversations 
between Naguib and Nahas, which suggested that the General 
was actively promoting the Wafd's return to power" (Nutting 
1972:65). Having collaborated in the publication of these 
taped conversations, the newspapers were not aware that 
this was the first step in their eventual exploitation in 
Nasser's extensive campaigns of popular persuasion. 
Nasser thus won the decisive round, but the final 
~ouches on this drama took place in Alexandria on October 
26, 1954. While he was delivering a speech six shots were 
fired a~ hi~ from a range of a few feet. Every bullet 
missed its mark and he shouted "Remember that if anything 
should happen to me, the Revolution will go on, for each 
, 
of you is a Gamal Abdul Nasser" (Stephens 1972:136). That 
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the bullets missed Nasser despite their close range and 
\ 
Nasser's apparent lack of shock when coupled with the fact 
that the would-be assassin was accused of having connections 
with both the General and the Moslem Brotherhood raises 
serious questions about the incident's authenticity. It is 
the perfect crime in terms of achieving Nasser's goals, and 
several people raised the possibility that he may indeed 
have some knowledge -- if not the planning -- of its origin. 
That this approach is Machiavellian is confirmed by none 
other than Nasser who wrote that 11Political action is not 
undertaken by angels but by human beingsn(Dekmejian 1971: 
XVIII). 
Baghdad, Bandung and Legitimacy 
The fact that Nasser has finally won the battle 
against the General did not spell the end of his troubles. 
For in practical terms, and as far as the man in the street 
is concerned, Naguib represented the respectability and 
confidence that translated into legitimacy. Nasser and 
his colleagues were still somewhat of an enigma in the 
eyes of the broad masses. This fact was quickly grasped 
by Dekmejian nif anything, the crisis in legitimacy loomed 
greater than ever after Naguib's overthrow" (Dekmejian 
1971:38). This search for legitimacy was quickly directed 
to issues outside Egypt's immediate borders. For as early 
as the latter two months 1954 Nasser launched a massive 
campaign of public speeches, press attacks and radio 
programs against the signing by the Iraqi government of 
~hat became known as the Baghdad Pact. The Pact is a 
defense treaty "proposing that Iraq should renew her 
defense relationship with Britain within a ~iddle East 
Alliance (of pro-Western governments) ... " (Nutting 
\ 
197 2: 76) . 
Both the Arab governments and Arab masses appeared 
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to have responded favorably to Nasser's vehement opposition 
to a pact that didn't seem to have their best interests 
at heart. Eventually the success of his campaign and 
initiative in inter-Arab affairs must have given him the 
exposure that is a pre-requisite for legitimacy. Never-
theless Nasser's image at that period was best described 
by Malcolm. Kerr as rrsecretive, broodiDg, nervous, uncom-
mu:iicative, ill at ease in public ... " (Kerr 1969:9). 
It took another adventure abroad to bring him a fair amount 
of the legitimacy he much needed. The convening of the 
Ba~dung Conference, April 1955, marked the first time in 
history in which the leaders of thirty newly independent 
African and Asian states gathered to discuss matters of 
mutual interest to them. Suddenly Nasser found himself 
rubb shoulders with such leaders as Chou En-Lai, 
Sukarno, and Nehru. Nasser's diligent performance during 
the conference won him the praise and a measure of esteem 
from the older and more experienced leaders. But, maybe 
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more important, was Bandung's meaning in the eyes of the 
Egyptian peop Of this particularly significant aspect 
Professor Lacouture writes, nAt the end of April 1955, 
Nasser suddenly emerged as the nation's acknowledged leader. 
He was governing Egypt and uniting her people .... 
Before 1955 his relation to the people was totally 
different from what it was the day he entered Cairo, April 
22, his portrait flanked by those of Nehru and Chou En-Lai, 
his jeep carried along by the mob to indicate the signi 
cance of the event: identification has taken place" 
(Lacouture 1970:108). 
Nasser's newly found rapprochment with the Egyptian 
, people as well as his widening circle of contacts on the 
international scene -- ranging from Chou En-Lai and Tito 
to K. Roosevelt of the CIA -- seem to have opened his eyes 
to new possibilities. Egypt was no longer the sole theater 
of operations. His appetite for power and glory looked 
beyond Egypt to the whole Arab World and as he wrote the 
Philosophy of Revolution, "The pages of history are also 
full of heroic roles and glorious roles which never found 
"heroes" to perform them. For some reason it seems to me 
that within the Arab circle there is a role ... beckoning 
for us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its cos-
tume, since no one else is qualified to play it" (Nasser 
1955:88). 
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The Suez Confrontation 
Having consolidated his position at home, and 
established a reputation for being able to mix with other 
international leaders, Nasser now turned his attention to 
improvements that were sorely needed in Egypt .. A land 
reform ~rograro was initiated earlier, limiting the number of 
acres that an individual is allowed to own to 200. To the 
nullions of impoverished farmers this was a step in the right 
direction, but only a step. But in order to feed more 
people, more cultivable land was needed. Thus in the first 
decade of this century, a dam was built at Aswan increasing 
the area of cultivation. When the dam was first built there 
were about 12 million mouths to feed; but by 1955 the 
population was 23 million and rising at a net rate of one 
thousand in every twenty-four hours. 
The solution to this dilemma seemed to reside in 
the building of a huge and expensive dam that would also 
conserve the waters of the life-giving flood so that it 
would provide perennial irrigation. The proJect was to cost 
$1 billion, $400 million of which would be in foreiqn 
exchange. The World Bank would lend Egypt $200 million and 
the U.S. (and Great Britain) would contribute the other 
$200 million between theme But Nasser's independent policy, 
especially recognition of Peking and the buying of arms from 
the Russians, did not set well with the U.So Secretary 0£ 
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State John F. Dulles. Genuinely perturbed by Nasser's 
moves, Secretary Dulles withdrew his previous offer claiming 
that Egypt's economy was too weak to Justify such a loan. 
Strained for an alternative source of foreign 
exchange, Nasser reasoned that by nationalizing the Suez 
Canal Company he would have enough hard currency to build 
the Aswan Dam. Nationalization of the company won the 
approval of the Arab World as well as that of most third 
world countries since as Nasser put it, 0 Egypt beca!l1e the 
property of the canal, and the Canal Company became a state 
within a state." (Nutting 1972:145). This act of defiance, 
coming as it did in a fiery nationalistic speech, infuriated 
the Western countries and resulted in the coordinated in-
vasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel. The failure 
of the Tripartite invasion is the result of many factors 
that coalesced in Egypt's favor. To begin with, both maJor 
powers were opposed to it. Third world countries also saw 
Egypt's struggle to be legiti~ate, and Arab governments 
solidly supported Egypt. In his determination to fight back, 
Nasser was in tune with the Egyptian people's mood of 
defiance .. 
Egypt's success in frustrating the invading forces 
and eventually bringing about their withdrawal was depicted 
as a major political and military victoryo Nasser's role 
in this crisis was excessively exaggeratedo The radio, the 
papers, books and songs were all employed in a campaign 
designed to glorify him throughout the Arab worlde 
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The Road to the Six-day War 
The i~age Nasser acquired throughout the Arab 
World, as a result of his communicational blitz, was one 
of a leader both determined and capable. It is a result 
of this conviction that the Syrian leadership sought unity 
with Egypt under his leadership. Syria, at the time, was 
a country plagued with internal strife and a fierce compe-
tition among the various political factions. Thus "faced 
with the threat of political chaos, a group of young Syrian 
officers decided early in 1958 to force the issue by putting 
to Nasser a request for an immediate union with Egypt." 
(Nutting 1972:i12). As soon as the merger was declared, 
problems began to surface. Incapable of sharing leadership, 
Nasser soon fell out with many of those who were his enthu-
siastic followers. By pushing a socialist program, he also 
alienated the powerful merchant groups. The reasons are 
many and varied, but in three years the union was dissolved 
and Nasser's prestige in the Arab World became the prime 
victim. 
Neither did Nasser's involvement in the Yemen bring 
him any reward. Egypt's interference on behalf of the 
republican side was extremely costly both in terms of human 
life and basic material. Hundreds of soldiers were killed 
in that remote and wretched war, and Nasser was never able 
fully and satisfactorily explain it to the Egyptian people. 
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Yemen thus became "Egypt's Vietnam". (Dekmejian 1971:306). 
Nasser's career has, until now, been through many ups and 
downs and he was almost always able to bounce back. But 
the combination of these two setbacks was extremely costly 
in prestige both inside Egypt, and throughout the Arab 
World. Nasser, as a result, developed a seige mentality 
and became less accessible to those who sought to meet with 
him. Nutting's diagnosis is especially pertinent, "Thus 
wrapped in a protective cocoon of yes-men, Nasser became 
increasingly intolerant of criticism and ever more inclined 
to hear only what he wanted to hear." (Nutting 1972:307). 
To a leader who premised his existence on representing the 
Arab people in general and on promises of great accomplish-
ments, this did not bode well indeed. 
The Six-day War 
As a result of these and other less known setbacks, 
Nasser became more and more isolated as he has alienated 
most Arab governments. He was accused, with some justifica-
of being militant toward Israel only on the radio. 
Why has Egypt's borders been so quiet for so long when other 
Arab countries' borders with Israel are not? Did he intend, 
they asked, to redress the grievances of the Palestinians 
through rhetorical attacks on other Arab governments, or was 
he preparing for the "battle of destiny" against the Israeli 
enemy? Suddenly Nasser was trapped by his own militant 
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rhetoric. Israel's attack on a Jordanian village and on 
the Syrian Air Force in early 1967 brought intolerable 
pressures for action. Arab dignity was at stake and Egypt 
must be in the forefront of its defenders. 
Egypt's defeat in the Six-day War seemed to be a 
logical conclusion to the fragmentation on the Arab scene. 
His army badly crushed, the leader's power base was for all 
practical purposes disintegrating. All the hopes he raised, 
and all the dreams he nursed were suddenly and severely 
shattered. Nasser's resignation and his being held account-
able for the disaster must have been the logical outcomes 
of the situation. That this hasn't happened is due more to 
the manner in which Nasser used the communication outlets 
available to him, than it is to any other combination of 
factors. R. Stephens described what took place: 
non the evening of 9 June, Nasser spoke 
to the nation over radio and television. On 
the screen he appeared a broken man. His 
features were drawn and haggard, his voice 
half choking and hesitant as he read the text 
of his speech. The enemy (he said) had struck 
with a stronger blow than had been expected, 
showing that 'there were other forces behind 
him which came to settle their account with 
the Arab Nationalist Movement'. He announced 
that he had decided to give up all his official 
posts and every political role .•• He had 
asked Zacharia Mohieddin to take over the post 
of President of the Republic •.• " (Stephens 
1972: 506). 
There are essentially three elements in this appear-
ance-speech that need to be taken into account. A--Nasser's 
sympathy arousing appearance: The belligerent, always 
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smiling and outspoken leader was now a defeated man. 
Lacouture captured the essential meaning of this, "It was 
not wisdom that they expected from the chief, but physical 
presence, warm and fleshy. He seemed all the more real now 
that 'he was obviously at fault and unhappy •.. A rapport 
of personification and incorporation.' (Lacou~ure 1973: 
312-313). B--There were also Nasser's accusation that the 
'Arab Nationalist Movement' was the target of the attack 
and that other forces were behind Israel. He, in other 
words, is the victim of an international conspiracy bent 
upon defeating the Arab Nationalist Movement, he claimed 
to represent. The implication, one senses, is that submis-
sion to this conspiracy is the ending of the era of inde-
pendence. The dream of Arab unity, he implied, would also 
forever be buried. c--Nasser's nomination of Mr. Mohieddin 
to replace him was a gamble he knew he couldn't lose. A 
founding member of the free officers movement responsible 
for the 1952 revolution, Mr. Mohieddin was an efficient 
technocrat who had opposed some of Nasser's most frivolous 
policies. The President and his men have unfairly depicted 
him as a pro-Western who would eventually lead Egypt into 
the imperialist fold. He was projected to the people as a 
symbol of retreat and compromise. 
Needless to say, thousands of people took to the 
streets in a spontaneous outpouring of National solidarity~ 
Nasser's resignation, many argued, should not be the result 
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of external pressureso To the world outside, this didn't 
make much sense. If Nasser was indeed responsible for the 
defeat, as he has admitted, then why keep him on the helm 
of power? The answer to this questions has not yet been 
fully answered. Part of the answer, however, lays in 
Nasser's use of television -- this extremely volati 
medium~ He was for the first time, in a period of crisis, 
able to reach the people liveo Thus when all the elements 
that went into this stunning comeback are sorted out, the 
leader's ability to coIT.municate his message so directly 
and so dramatically should not be treated slightly. 
Nasser's clever use of television in his attempt 
to regain the confidence of the Egyptian people, after it 
was abundantly clear that his power base was all but eradi-
cated, is perhaps the most extreme example of the manner 
in which neo-charismatic leaders manipulate the communica-
tion channels available to them. It is perhaps also true 
that not too many of these leaders have used society's 
communication channels to the extent to which Nasser haso 
However, no less an authority than Edward Shils has writ.ten 
that such an exercise may indeed be a prerequisite among 
newly independent states for the emergence of the nation-
state .. He wrote that 0 Demagogy, or rhetorical charisroa, 
which used to be called 'rabble-rousing' and is now called 
'mobilization of the masses', so~etimes appears to be a 
short cut to this objective .. " (Pye 1963:64) .. 
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Using All Channels 
A full account of Nasser 1 s communication strategy 
is beyond the scope of this paper, since the channels used 
are tqo many to enumerate. The depth and the breadth of 
this strategy will, hopefully, become less obscure as a 
result of our attempt to understand the manner in which it 
operated. 
1--Radio and Television: Nasser's communication 
strategy has relied rather heavily on radio, especially in 
the first decade following the revolution. As was mentioned 
earlier, the change in name of the Ministry of Information 
to the Ministry of National Guidance was clearly indicative 
of the significance given to its functions. Douglas Boyd 
in an article on the Development of Egypt's Radio described 
the early importance given this instrument, "Egypt's govern-
ment therefore inherited a modestly staffed and equipped 
radio service which in 1952 had no short wave capability: 
and only 72 Kilowatts ••• [which grew] ••• to more than 
one-half million watts by 1956 .•• and that by 1960 the 
total medium and short-wave power was over 1.3 million 
watts." (Boyd 1975:645-651). 
Why was all this emphasis placed on radio when other 
sectors of the impoverished Egyptian society may have better 
used the funds involved? Daniel Lerner provided a signifi-
cant part of the answer. "Nasser," he maintained, "has 
converted his earlier view that Egyptian society was not 
'ready' for mass participation into a more daring hypothesis, 
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that he can use the mass media to achieve national consensus 
without unduly raising public demands for full participation. 
This feat hinges upon effective control of the media, along 
with all other channels of access to the Egyptian mass." 
(Lerner 1958:251)0 But in the Nasserist scheme, radio was 
not only a means of achieving national consensus (within 
Egypt), but an instrument whose ultimate function is to 
enhance his prestige throughout the Arab World. Boyd noted 
that "Nasser's accomplishments had been broadcast to every 
corner of the Arab World. 0 (Boyd 1975:649) .. In a society 
whose traditions are oral in origin, radio tends to replace 
story tellers and the like. A$ Loya described this pheno-
menon, "It should be noted", he wrote, "that there is hardly 
an Arab who does not buy a radio set as soon as he can 
afford it ••. the advent of the transistor radio made 
things considerably easier ••. " (Loya 1962:100). Given 
this condition, it is no wonder then that Nasser's reputa-
tion and appeal became increasingly predominant and especially 
in view of his early accomplishments including the nation-
alization of the Suez Canal Company~ 
Certain events, however, combined to reduce the 
impact and influence of Nasser's radio over the Arab masses. 
To begin with, the dissolution of the United Arab Republic 
as a result of Syria's withdrawal has greatly undermined 
Nasser's reputation in the area. Secondly, attacks against 
other Arab regimes, and especially Saudi Arabia whom Nasser 
attacked over the Yemen conflict, did not produce the 
results he hoped for and consequently put into question 
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his ability and judgement. In the process, the Arab radio 
listeners became more discriminating and more critical. 
Suffice it to say, however, that radio has played such a 
crucial role in Nasser's overall policy that UoNo Secretary 
General D. Hammarskjold asked for its "disarmament" and 
that Nasser's response then was, "If you ask me for radio 
disarmament, it means that you are asking me for complete 
disarmament." (Boyd 1975: 651) .. 
Radio Cairo's discredited role in the 1967 war, 
including its infamous campaign of lies and exaggerations, 
brought about the end of its prominence and the beginning 
of a new medium -- television. Television's basic defi-
ciency for a mass-persuasion-minded leadership is its 
localisme The fact that local television services in other 
Arab countries have removed from Radio Cairo a substantial 
number of its listeners has further eroded its impact. On 
the other hand, television served Nasser well at a moment 
of near collapse in the aftermath of Egypt's defeat in the 
Six-day War. The image of a broken leader groping for 
dignity must have touched a large number of people. In 
bringing the leader to the living rooms and the cafes of 
Cairo, television kept Nasser afloat against great odds. 
2--The Press: The Egyptian press is one of the 
oldest in the third world. Having started with the advent 
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of the French occupation at the end of the 18th century, 
it has maintained a robust and vigorous amount of freedom 
until Nasser, sensing its potential to his communication 
strategy, nationalized it in 1960. Unlike radio, the 
press was privately owned, and l~ss willing to advocate 
without discussion of all of the government programs. A 
variety of measures designed to subordinate the press were 
undertaken (including the publishing of government owned 
papers), but they have all ended in failureo Having been 
nationalized, the press became another viable instrument in 
the leader's drive to mobilize the masseso 
The extent of Nasser's involvement in the day-to-
day operation of the press reveals something about the 
priority communication takes in his overall policy. Prior 
to nationalization, Nasser used to read the papers daily 
in order to "decide whether the editors and censors did 
their job well. If not, they will soon hear about it". 
(St. John 1960:227). After the nationalization, his 
involvement became even steeper since he was known to 
interfere in such things as what is a proper headline and 
was often nputting his hand on the brush-proof", and would 
be "voraciously rereading the proof itself". 
1973:358) .. 
(Lacouture 
So important has the press been for Nasser's style 
of leadership that his closest protege, Ma Heykal, was the 
editor and publisher of one of Cairo's papers~ In his 
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capacity as "the principal cook in the kitchen of Egyptian 
politics under Nasser", Heykal's task was to "prepare the 
political theatre for his boss." (F. Mattar 1974:10). His 
' weekly column was read by those who wanted to understand 
the leadership's thinking, but also served to supply the 
various opinion leaders with cues as to what ought to be 
stressed and advocated and what ought to be avoided or rici-
culed. Cairo's newspaper daily circulation of 800,000 (in 
1968) reached only 28 out of 1000 inhabitants. (Almaney 
1972:346). As such, it directly reached only a small number 
of readers, but many of those were local influentials and 
party members who dissiminated the leadership's line. It 
was all part of the leader's effort to "mold the masses' 
opinions to his own liking. II . . 
"Nasser wanted the Egyptians to know only what he 
thought they ought to know ••• creating opinions in them 
arousing their passions, and motivating them to strive for 
the country's (his) goals." (Almaney 1972:348). 
3--Educational and socialization systems: The manner 
in which the educational and other socialization systems 
have been used to glorify Nasser and project him as the em-
bodiment of Arab unity, of justice and of peace, is central 
to a proper perception of the period. In the educational 
sphere this involves the creation of new courses on "National 
enlightenment" and other such subjectsG The primary objec-
tive of such courses was to educate the students on the 
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relationship between the leader and the "dialectics of 
Arab history''. Simply stated this means that without 
Nasser's leadership and vision, the Arab people would 
continue to be backward and unimportant9 Traditional 
courses were also changed to accomodate this trend and 
emphasis. P .. Vatikiotis noted that 11 Both the Minister of 
Education and the Director-General of the Ministry in 1958 
argued the importance of 'directed' and directive' educa-
tion". (Vatikiotis 1961:129) o < 
So pervasive has been the emphasis on the leader 
and his view of history that Dekrnejian observed that "A 
cursory survey will reveal that the Nasserite historian 
did not possess a real cho~ce; the imperatives of his present 
narrowed his choice to the adoption and glorification of 
only one period (in Arab history), one dynasty, and one 
ruler -- Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi"a (Dekmejian 1971:77). 
Similarly, book authors and publishers were urged to adhere 
to this "directiveness". "For this purpose," writes 
Vatikiotis, 11 a higher council 0£ Arts, Letters, and Social 
Sciences was decreed by the government to direct, supervise, 
and channel literary, artistic, and research activities 
within the prescribed goals of the Revolution°. (Vatikiotis 
1961:126). Hundreds of books, fictional and non-fictional 
were published in praise of the leader, his vision and 
accomplishments. Many Egyptian writers, in the relatively 
open period following the Six-day War, have criticized this 
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homogenization process and "called for the lifting of 
government censorship on literature". (Dekmejian 1971:267). 
This rigid censorship, which served the leader so 
well, resulted in the decline of the thriving and critical 
Egyptian theatre. Newsreels and movies, which by now 
were reaching larger segments of the population, became 
also engulfed in this campaign. But more significant, in 
an oral society, is the process by which the leader employed 
the traditional authoritarian segments of the society for 
the pursuit of his elevationo There is, in fact, no defini-
tive account of how precisely this is accomplished~ 
4--The Leader's Rhetoric: No aspect of the third 
world's leader's communication strategy is more critical 
than his ability to directly speak to his people and arouse 
in them an appreciation for his plans and dreams. In a 
society so respectful of authority and oratorical skill, 
as the Egyptians are, the leader's ability to forcefully 
and imaginatively articulate some of the people's grievances 
and ambitions is vital to botha Nasser;s rhetorical 
strategy involves more than his speaking stylea It involves 
the image he intentionally projects. It also involves the 
symbols, the slogans and the code words he deems helpful 
to his message. Finally, as a public speaker, the leader's 
style and his ability to retain the attention and the 
interest of the listeners is extremely vltalo 
Earlier in his career, Nasser was a timid speaker 
who as a conspirator was both fearful and distrustful of 
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the people. He preferred the back seats to the speaker's 
platform. Robert St. John observed that "At the same time 
of the revolution Nasser was one of the world's worst 
public speakers. He had neither personal nor political 
magnetism. 11 (St~ John 1960:237). Leadership cannot, of 
course, be solely built around the leader's speaking abilityo 
He has to share something with his audience, and this some-
thing was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Lacouture 
witnessed this event and eloquently described it, 11 He spoke 
in a familiar tone, what Egyptians call baladi, the popular 
language, this time, not straining for a noble style as he 
had done before. The austere disciplinarian was transformed 
into a popular singer 
Gamal (Nasser) went on, mimicking diplomats and 
caricaturing their statements. This timid man had Just 
discovered in the depths of his anger, how to talk to the 
people 11 • (Lacouture 1973: 169). 
Eventually Nasser's speeches took on a ritualistic 
form which begins usually with the media advertising and 
speculating about his upcoming speech. The day he delivers 
his speech, radio and television interrupt their regular 
programming in order to describe the events beginning 
with the moment he leaves his home to the moment he returns 
to it. Prior to the speech a radio broadcaster famous for 
his hair-raising rhetorical ability introduces Nasser in 
words designed to elicit the greatest amount of response 
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from the audience. Radio and television broadcast a large 
number of songs by Egypt's best singers "lavishing praise" 
on him as the hero of unity, prosperity and freedom. (Boyd 
1975:647). 
In promoting his "myth", Nasser was aided by a 
towering physical presence as well as a sense of confidenceo 
Robert St. John saw the significance of this asset, "Many 
of them (Egyptians) have bodies wracked by illness. His 
is straight and strong. He is the mirror in which they 
see their own reflection; the reflection of themselves as 
they would like to be." (St. John 1960:237). This is 
further supplemented by the usage of provocative slogans 
designed to enhance the leader's myth by linking it to 
significant national aspirations. The strength and appeal 
of these slogans is a function of their pertinence and 
timeliness. Thus when Nasser admonished his countrymen to 
"Lift your head, comrade, the time of humiliation has 
passed!", he was in fact articulating their deepest yearning. 
(Lacouture 1973:276). Another slogan that was often invoked 
by Nasser, "We have an appointment with destiny", attempted 
to link the hope of unity, and thus progress, to Nasser's 
leadership and vision. It was the promise of progress 
and fulfillment, based to be sure upon some tangible 
accomplishments, that gave Nasser's speeches the aura they 
enjoyed. 
Nasser's ability to "sway audiences" has improved 
remarkably, leading M. Khadduri, one of the Arab World 1 s 
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most astute observers to rerrark that nhe began to indulge 
in oratory, and he soon excelled in rhetorical speeches. 
"The manner in which he made public speeches was 
deliberately intended to excite the ~asses -- although most 
of his speeches were verbose and repetitiousP. (Khadduri 
1973:60). Although a systematic exploration of Nasser's 
speeches is beyond the scope of this project, nevertheless, 
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his speech on the occasion of the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal should be fairly sufficient to present the 
leader-speaker at his besto 
The first observation, and one that Lacouture 
noted, is that in this speech Nasser has abandoned the 
tradition of speaking in strictly classical Arabic. His 
use of a mixture of classical and colloquial language 
was an indication of the ease he felt since he was now 
on the offensive on an issue in which he knew the Egyptian 
people approved. The second observation is one that is 
related to the excessively repetitious tone of the speech 
especially when one notes the number of times (25) he 
repeated statements carrying the same meaningQ A third 
observation involves the use of what Mo Suleiman terms 
"fantastic metaphors". Statements such as "Arab Nationalism 
has been set afire from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian 
Gulf" attest to this tendency in his speaking style. 
Fourthly, is Nasser 1 s strategy of building a common front 
with the audience in a manner designed to instill the feeling 
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of "us against them 11 • Here Nasser's use of code and 
suggestive words and meanings has served him rather well. 
Thus when he asserts that "We, the whole of Egypt in one 
front, a national block, united, announce that the whole of 
Egypt will fight. .", he in effect is trying to create 
a link connecting the leadership to the people. Another 
vivid example is contained in his reference to World Bank 
conditions as "Guardianship. over the Egyptian 
Government n 
Throughout his speech Nasser raises the spectre of 
foreign domination and injury to the Egyptian independence 
as the alternative to his proud and "dignified'' leadershipo 
' This, one must remember, is a common theme running through 
most of his speeches$ It is precisely this theme that 
dominated Nasser's resignation speech, and one that probably 
tipped the scales in his favor at a point when his leader-
ship suffered its Plost devastating setback. M. Suleiman 
explained the reasoning for this emphasis, "Dignity, honor, 
grandeur, and pride may and do mean something to a Westerner~ 
However, they do not carry the same connotation or arouse 
the same feelings and passions in him as they do in an Arab .. 11 
(Prosser 1973:294). 
5--0pinion Leaders: Opinion leaders, as have already 
been indicated in the previous chapter are "those individuals 
from whom others seek advice and information." (E .. Rogers 
1962:208). The centrality of opinion leaders to the communi-
cation process is well documented by Lazarsfeld and·others 
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(1944). As interpreters and transmitters of news and infor-
mation, Opinion Leaders perform extremely significant tasks 
expecially in societies where oral face-to-face communication 
is as important as it is in the Arab World. As James 
Mayfield correctly noted, "the popular village doctor, the 
influential ASU (party) leader, or the respected council 
chairman wield power and authority because of personal, 
face-to-face relationships that they have developed." 
(Mayfield 1971:288). 
This process is especially apparent in the villages 
where, as Berger contends, "With only one party or none 
permitted, the central governments themselves, through the 
mass organizations they have set up, try to penetrate the 
villages and arouse a sense of national loyalty .•. " 
(Berger 1962:62). Authority structures in the rural areas 
become increasingly dependent upon the central government, 
so does the latter's influence. Thus not only is communi-
cation as it reaches the village highly favorable to the 
leader, but those who participate in its transmission and 
interpretation are similarly partial to him~ In this 
process, again, radio and the newspaper are two of the most 
dramatic weans by which the village is being exposed to the 
city as never before. Comroenting on the significance of this 
process Lucian Pye notes that "the press and radio can have 
a profound influence in changing the ways of people only if 
they are fully supported by the informal, social channels 
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of communications which are intimately related to basic 
social pr?cesses." (Pye 1961:10). The Cafe, the corner 
grocery as well as other gathering places are used for 
this end. Daniel Lerner described the manner in which this 
takes place, "They hear, usually via the communal receiver 
at the village square in the presence of the local elite, 
the news and views selected for their ears by Egyptian State 
Broadcasting. Their receivers bring no alternative news 
from other radio stations." (Pye 1961:345). 
The impact of such a communication strategy has 
been documented by no less an authority on the area than 
Berger and Berq~eo Dr. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and a number of 
his students conducted a comprehensive study of. the commu-
nication systems in six Egyptian villages. One of their 
most interesting findings is that "Eighteen of 45 farmers 
and fully 11 of the 13 'others' were told the news by 
someone else in the village." {J. Tunstall 1970:329). They 
concluded, therefore, that "Next to the radio, this personal 
or 'two-step' flow of communication from the mass media 
was the most important source of news in the village sample 
studied." (Ibid:329). The fact that opinion leaders are 
often of higher status reinforces the credibility of the 
message they are relaying. Another example of the use of 
high status oral communicators in this process is revealed 
in B. Borthwick's study of the Islamic Sermon as a Channel 
of Political Communication. In a highly religious culture 
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such as that of Egypt, the Friday sermon is an important 
statement on the people's religious, social and political 
affairs. The leader's directives and pronouncements are 
thus praised and justified Nasser's adversaries are 
discredited and obedience to his authority is encouraged. 
This is all the more possible since "Under the revolutionary 
regime the contents of the sermons have been controlled by 
the government." (Prosser 1973:373). 
This cursory survey does not pretend to exhaust 
the extent or the size of Nasser's communication strategy. , 
Certain aspects of this strategy such as rallies, political 
fairs and party propaganda must be included in any definitive 
accounting of this strategy and the extent to which it 
contributed to the durability and continuity of his leader-
ship. This, then, is only meant to be a touching of the 
basis of an extensive campaign, to inform and influence, 
whose most unique feature is that it took into full account 
the environment surrounding it and proceeded to influence 
that environment. Lucian Pye articulated the impact and 
implications of this process, "There is a peculiarly 
intimate relationship between the political process and the 
communication process. For within the domain of politics 
the communication process has a fundamental function." 
(Pye 1961:6). 
The relationship Pye speaks of is revealed through 
what Lerner called Nasser's syndrome. In a society of 
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believers, Nasser's coromunication strategy strove to depict 
him as the people's contract with a superior force. One of 
his most favorite slogans, as indicated earlier, is the 
promise of an "appointment with destiny 0 • Nasser•s communi-
cation strategy was thus not above resorting to the meta-
physical and the supernatural. 
The Feedback: A Serious Flaw 
The basic problero in such a situation is the lack 
of adequate feedback. Leaaers need feedback as a corrective 
or as an enforcer to steer them away from or further into 
their present course. But as R. Fagen observea, "The 
dominant flow is downward." (Fagen 1966:33). This is 
partly due to the leader's feeling that he is better 
qualified to formulate the issues. This feeling is often 
predicated upon the view that the masses lack the necessary 
maturity and awareness to make such decisions. It is also 
due, as L. Pappas noted, to the fact that "disciples -- or 
associates -- may serve as sources of information and as 
scapegoats for blame". (Pappas 1970: 8). As sources of 
information the disciples are inclined to paint a brighter 
picture than really exists, and as scapegoats they shield 
the leader and provide him with the excuses necessary to 
keep his reputation unscathed. The dearth of feedback 
available to the leader, then, comes from such sources as 
the intelligence service, the size of leader-sponsored 
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rallies, and betueen-the-lines criticism in letters to the 
editor. This is a serious flaw in the leader's communication 
strategy and one that tends to spill over once the leader 
is no longer on the stage. 
Conclusion 
The significance of the manner in which society's 
communication channels are us9d in third world countries 
is a matter that seems to have received only a scant atten-
tion in most social science literature. This would not be 
a matter of great importance were it not for the fact that 
it leads to a great deal of confusion in identifying some 
of the most central variables and concepts. Weber•s concept 
of charismatic leadership is a prime example of the facile 
manner in which a Western model is superimposed on a 
third world phenoroenon. The vast number of post-colonial 
third world leaders who have been labeled charismatic should 
have opened our eyes to the concept's deficiency in terms 
of explaining this phenomenon. 
In total agreement with Fiedlerts contention that 
the situation plays a vital role in the development and 
emergence of leadership, this study has attempted to show 
that Nasser's leadership has been the product of Egypt's 
tormented political and social situation in the early 
19SO's and 1960's. Thus, to label Nasser as a charismatic 
leader is to miss the essentially calculating and cynically 
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astute nature o~ his leadership. From the day he assumed 
power, this paper attempts to point out, Nasser has employed 
all of society's channels of communication in the service 
of a grand "comrmnication strategy" that played a vital role 
in his persistence in authority as the testimony of authori-
ties like Daniel Lerner makes aptly clear. 
Thus in almost all of the studies in which a 
serious attempt is made to unveil the nature of Nasser's 
leadership, the analysts have invariably concentrated on 
such variables as the systemts material achievements 
(Nutting), its coercive and repressive mechanisms (Vatikiotis), 
the leader's charismatic power (DekmeJian and Lacouture) or 
such a strange notion as BARAKAH (an Arabic term roughly 
meaning blessings). Consequently the leader's communication 
strategy, while occasionally alluded to, is seen as an 
insignificant aspect of his rule. The sparse amount of 
analytical treatment devoted to the system's communication 
strategy as a viable base of power is a prime cause for the 
confusion. To say that communication was a viable base of 
power is not to say that Nasser's leadership was drawn 
solely from it. This study's central contention, then, 
centers around a recognition of the influence communication 
plays along side such crucial elements as the economic and 
political bases of power. 
As the previous chapter attempts to point out, 
Nasser's communication strategy left no corners unturned. 
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It ·was in the school curriculum, in the street and cafe 
gatherings and in the music, the radio and the movies. As 
such it spanned all the available boundaries of society and 
utilized all the conceivable channelso In his drive to 
convince and persuade Nasser had a culturally homogenous 
population to address. This, of course, is an advantage 
that leaders such as Sukarno and Nkrumah did not enjoy, 
and one that could explain their demise whereas Nasser was 
able to maintain his rule despite obvious mistakes and 
Misguided adventures. Another advantage that Nasser seems 
to have enJoyed is the availability of a relatively competent 
group of experts who were able to draw on the experience of 
other govern~ents both in terms of devising and iroplementing 
this cor..munication strategy. (Copeland, 1969:99). It is 
worthwhile to rer.ember at this point that despite a discern-
ible improvement in his speech delivery and occasional 
moments of rapport ·with his audience, Nasser has never 
achieved the oratorical excellence of someone like Hitler. 
Otto Strasser cescribed this aspect of Hitler's power: 
uHis words go like an arrow to their 
target, he touches each private wound on the 
raw, liberating the mass unconscious, expressing 
its inner111ost aspirations, telling it what it 
most wants to hear.. 0 (Bullock 1964:374). 
Thus a leader of a post-colonial third world country 
is capable through the use of the various communication 
outlets -- provided, of course, that he has the expertise 
ana a reasonable degree of cultural homogeneity -- to 
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influence his impressionable population in a manner consistent 
with his ambitions and programs. And it is precisely this 
aspect of the study that needs to be more closely examined by 
social scientists, and especially communication students. 
This need is predicated upon two factors: 
A As third world governments become more and 
more acquainted with the potentially powerful impact of 
communication strategies upon their populations, they may 
be inclined to institute such strategies as integral parts 
of their rule. Communication, thus, becomes not an instru-
ment of information but one of control. The low level of 
education in many of these countries makes this all the 
more possible. 
B -- A corrollary concern is the fact that while it 
is patently clear that effective utilization of communication 
channels can enhance the goals of national development, it 
is equally clear that it can be used for the opposite goals. 
Egypt's case is clearly instructive. After the debacle of 
the six day war Nasser initially justified the defeat on the 
grounds that American and British planes were providing 
Israel with a "protective umbrella". (Lacouture 1973:309). 
When it became known to the public that this explanation-
Justification was in variance with the facts, Nasser 
resorted to semi-metaphysical explanationsr nBrothers, 
perhaps God wanted to test us to judge whether we deserve 
what we have achieved ... etc .. " (Prosser 1973:314). 
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Nasser has earlier used similar arguments in defense of his 
arroy•s ilure in its Yeroen expedition. What we have then 
is a case of the leader using his monopoly over cormnunication 
channels in a manner that is at once blatantly deceptive and 
an aid in his attempt to escape public accountabilityo 
The cumulative impact of this use of communication 
was echoed by Egypt I s r10st renowned writer, Tawfig Al-
Hakeem, nHe (Nasser) controlled the people's mind in a manner 
similar to the impact of drugs., ... " (Al-Ahr am, 197 5) 
Perhaps the ultimate testimony is contained in 
the suddeness \ll th which Nasser fell from public favor in 
his country. For today, not only is Nasser's name and 
reputation the subJect of daily examination and often condem-
nation, but his policies and commitments seem to have 
largely been reversed~ 11 The image of the late President 
Nasser of Egypt, 11 wrote the Christian Science Monitor, "is 
crystallizing as a major political issue ., .. " (Thursday, 
February 26, 1967). It is this fact of Nasser's leadersh~p 
and its apparently time-bound nature that explains what 
Western intellectuals mistook to be ''charismatic 11 for what 
in reality was a well orchestrated communication strategy .. 
R. Bendix termed this "a lacuna in Weber's approach to 
charisma.u Weber, according to Bendix, ndid not foresee 
that it would be possible to simulate publicly all aspects 
of charismatic leadership - saturating all channels of 
communication so that no one could escape the message.,. 
(Bendix, 1968:625). 
98 
This, I would argue, is radically different from 
Weber's original concept of charismatic leadership, for it 
rests not on the leader~s inner qualities, but on his 
ability to conceive and execute an image of himself that 
gives the semblance and not the substance of charismatic 
leadership. 
This, then, is a case of engineered consent, or 
nee-charismatic leadership, in as rouch as it fails to exhibit 
those qualities deemed essential to a charismatic leader. 
There is another sense in which the engineered nature of 
this brand of leadership is readily demonstrable. The 
string of failures -- Syria's secession, the Yemen war, 
the Six Day war as well as economic difficulties -- that 
followed the leader's initial successes should have been 
sufficient to undermine his authority. That they have not, 
is due in large measure to his ability to communicate and 
proJect, without competition, an i~age and a persona that 
could not sustain the light of day once this monopoly 
ceased to exist as a result of his departure. 
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